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The global market is transforming rapidly as globalization is influenced by advanced 
information, communication, and technological development. Companies in the food and 
agricultural sector, including agri-food cooperatives in New Zealand, have embraced 
these global trends. Many agricultural co-operatives in New Zealand (NZ) have been 
successful in growing their business globally by implementing different 
internationalization strategies.  
 
This study analyses how co-operatives internationalize and the factors that influence them 
in the decision making of internationalization. The key objectives of the study were to 
outline the internationalization process of the agricultural co-operatives in NZ, to identify 
the internationalization strategies chosen by the agricultural co-operatives studied, and to 
analyze the factors that influence the internationalization decision. 
 
The present research was conducted using a multiple-case study from two chosen 
agricultural co-operatives in New Zealand. The Tatua Co-operative and Alliance Group 
Co-operative were selected as the participants because of their successful history of 
internationalization in the dairy and red-meat industry. The participants were selected by 
using a purposive sampling method in order to ensure that insights from the important 
and relevant actors were included. A qualitative approach, using semi-structured 
interviews for primary data and annual reports for secondary data, was implemented to 
obtain the information. The cross-case analyses were performed to compare the results of 
both co-operatives.  
 
The two co-operatives studied could be considered as born-global because they went into 
the global market soon after their establishment. Even though they are born-globals, they 
internationalized in a gradual way. The external factors of internationalization were 
analyzed using the Porter’s Five Forces Analysis. Based on the competitive position, both 
co-operatives are still using the export-based strategy as their main strategy of 
internationalization, and  each  implement a focus strategy and differentiation of products 
to be successful in the global market.  
 
The internal factors that have influenced the choice of each internationalization strategy 
were identified in this study. The most influencing factors for both co-operatives are 
network and experience. The other influencing factors are human resources. Both co-
operatives agree that financial resources are more considered in foreign direct investment 
than exporting because they expose bigger risk. This study also reinforces that technology 
does not have the largest role in accelerating the internationalization process of the co-
operatives. Lastly, the challenges vary for each strategy and are perceived differently by 
each co-operative.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.Background 
The rapid growth of the global economy, influenced by the advancement of information, 
communication, and technology (ICT), has triggered firms to grow their business in the 
international market (Harrison, Dalkiran, & Elsey, 2000). The international market offers 
a wide market opportunity for firms to expand their business due to the large market size 
and potential (Jane, 2012). Internationalization has become an effect of the globalization 
where the world becomes more borderless, communication links are faster and cheaper, 
inter-region interaction has increased, and transportation and logistics are easier to access 
(Hughes & O'Neill, 2008).  
 
Developing the business in the international market has, not only been performed by the 
multinational enterprises, but also by family businesses, small-medium enterprises as well 
as co-operatives (Mauget, 2005). Co-operatives have proven that they also play a 
significant role in the world economy. The International Co-operative Alliance state that 
the largest 300 co-operatives are estimated to have contributed USD2.2 trillion, which is 
about 2.2 percent of the World Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Altman, 2017).  
 
Numerous studies have been conducted on the co-operatives’ internationalization. A 
study by Mauget (2005) questioned whether the benefit of the co-operative in the 
internationalization is less than that of a firm. He also examined if there were any 
differences in internationalization strategy approaches between the co-operatives and 
global firms. However, Hansen (2009) has concluded in his study that the global 
competition for co-operatives in the future will be more intense. Thus, globalization will 
push the co-operatives to implement major structural and strategic changes for the 
internationalization process. A study in Brazil by Ritossa and Bulgacov (2009) has 
identified and described the possible impacts of internationalization and diversification 
strategies on the results of agricultural cooperatives in the state of Parana. Donoso (2003) 
has studied the challenges in the internationalization of the New Zealand agricultural 
cooperative. The focus was on the potential conflicts that might arise among the members 





Co-operatives have unique characteristics that differentiate them from other forms of 
businesses. The difference is the co-operative is owned by the people who use it, 
controlled by the people who use it, and the benefits are generated on the basis of 
patronage (Garnevska, Callagher, Apparao, Shadbolt, & Siedlok, 2017). Co-operatives 
perform internationalization to obtain global efficiency, manage risk by portfolio 
diversification, acceleration of innovation and learning, follow the global trend and build 
global reputation (Thompson, Strictland, & Gamble, 2010). In addition, Hansen (2009) 
argue that, besides increasing global competition, the internationalization of the co-
operative still has to answer the main objective which is to generate the highest profit to 
benefit the owners.  
 
Many sectors are urged to adapt to the global competition, including the co-operatives in 
the agricultural sector (Hansen, 2009). Agricultural cooperatives, in many countries, play 
a significant role in economic growth and contribute to a higher standard of living for 
farmers (Fernández, 2014). The World Co-operative Monitor state that 27 percent of the 
top 300 co-operatives’ total output has been generated by the agriculture and food 
industry co-operatives (Altman, 2017). This also includes the agricultural co-operatives 
in New Zealand where they play an important role in the economy. If a co-operative wants 
to explore the international market, it has to choose an internationalization strategy into 
foreign market carefully. This is a complex and important decision to be made with 
various factors to be considered that will lead to higher performance of the co-operative 
(Shen, Puig, & Paul, 2017).  
 
The global market is transforming rapidly as globalization is influenced by advanced 
information, communication, and technological (ICT) development. Companies in the 
food and agricultural sector, including agri-food cooperatives in New Zealand, have 
embraced these global trends. Many agricultural co-operatives in New Zealand have been 
successful in growing their businesses globally by implementing different 
internationalization strategies in the form of exporting and a range of other approaches 
including direct foreign investment. However, limited studies have been conducted on 
the internationalization of agricultural co-operatives in New Zealand. The specific 
interest in this study is to understand better how co-operatives have embraced these global 






A co-operative is a common business form in New Zealand. The co-operative sector 
comprises a large part of the NZ economy. The top 30 co-operatives and mutuals 
contributed 17.5% revenue to NZ GDP in 2015 (Garnevska et al., 2017). In 2012, the 
United Nations listed New Zealand as the most co-operative economy (Garnevska et al., 
2017). A recent study found that revenue of more than NZD 28 billion per annum is 
gained from New Zealand's top 15 agricultural cooperatives, including co-operatives in 
dairy and red-meat as the largest sector. It also provides employment to about 42,000 
people and has a membership of over 199,000  (Garnevska, Callagher, Apparao, & 
Shadbolt, 2018). 
 
New Zealand has an unfavourable geographic location which might hinder international 
transactions because of the high cost of transportation and logistics (Scott-Kennel, 2013). 
However, despite the geographic limitation, New Zealand has become one of the largest 
players in the world’s agricultural industry. New Zealand is a country that is highly 
dependent on international trade as the backbone of the economy (Scott-Kennel, 2013). 
Businesses are driven to develop in the international market because the local market in 
New Zealand is small and limited compared to the global market that offers many 
opportunities to grow.  The businesses that focus on the global market soon after the 
inception are known as ‘born-globals’ (Knight & Cavusgil, 1996).  
 
History has shown that exporting was the earlier internationalization strategy of 
agricultural co-operatives in New Zealand (Morris, 2017). However, exporting is not the 
only choice for them to internationalize their business. There are several determinants and 
risks that influence the co-operatives to choose their preferred entry modes (Erramili & 
Rao, 1990; Ahmed, Mohamad, Tan, & Johnson, 2002; Kraus, Ambos, Eggers & Cesinger, 
2015; Shen et al., 2017) 
 
The agricultural co-operatives in New Zealand have been successful in growing their 
business globally by implementing different internationalization in the form of exporting 
and a range of other strategies including direct foreign investment. However, not many 
studies have been conducted about internationalization of New Zealand co-operatives. 




internationalize successfully and the factors that influence them in the decision making 
of internationalization.  
 
1.3. Aim of Research 
This research aims to describe the internationalization process of agricultural co-




This study investigates the internationalization process of agricultural co-operatives from 
two chosen agricultural co-operatives in New Zealand. The key objectives of the study 
are: 
 to outline the internationalization process of the agricultural co-operatives in NZ 
 to identify the internationalization strategies chosen by the agricultural co-
operatives studied  
 to analyze the factors that influence the internationalization decision 
 
1.5. Structure of the Thesis 
This study includes seven chapters. Chapter one introduces the background of the study, 
problem statement, the aim, objectives and the structure of the thesis. Chapter two 
describes the relevant study background  including that of agricultural co-operatives and 
agricultural industry in New Zealand. Chapter three reviews the literature including the 
definition of internationalization, internationalization theories, internationalization 
strategies, and internationalization in Agri-food Industry. Moreover, this chapter also 
covers the description of co-operative theories, agricultural co-operatives and the 
internationalization process of agricultural co-operatives. Chapter four describes the 
methodology including the research strategy, sampling, data collection, and the selected 
data analysis technique.  Chapter five presents the results based on the case study of two 
co-operatives. Chapter six discusses the findings of studies where a cross-case analysis 
was performed to compare the results of these two co-operatives.  Chapter seven 
concludes the findings, limitations, implications of this study, together with suggestions 






CHAPTER TWO: STUDY BACKGROUND 
 
2.1.History of Agricultural Co-operatives in New Zealand 
New Zealand, a small country with a small population, is located remotely in th South 
Pacific region thus it is distant from larger markets (Scott-Kennel, 2013). Fortunately, it 
is gifted with natural advantages which makes the land suitable to develop an agricultural 
industry. Owing to the remoteness and small size of the market, New Zealand’s economy 
is largely dependent on the export of agricultural production (Evans & Meade, 2006). The 
agricultural sector still plays an important role in the economy of New Zealand. In 2012, 
the contribution of agriculture was 5.0 percent ($10.6 billion) of New Zealand’s gross 
domestic product (GDP). Agriculture is also a significant source of employment in New 
Zealand and,  in 2013, agriculture became the largest rural employer with 105,576 people 
(24.8 percent of people employed) (StatsNZ, 2015). A recent study found that New 
Zealand’s top 15 agricultural cooperatives generate revenue of more than NZD 28 billion 
per annum. They also provide employment to about 42,000 people and have over 199,000 
members (Garnevska et al., 2018).  
 
International trade of agricultural products has been in practice for a long time in New 
Zealand. In 1880, the supply of meat in New Zealand exceeded the local demand. 
Therefore, the first attempt to send frozen meat from New Zealand using refrigerated 
shipping to transport meat to Europe came about in 1882 (Hall). In 1984, the New Zealand 
Government withdrew agricultural subsidies, transforming New Zealand into one of the 
most open economies in the world (Scott-Kennel, 2013). International trade liberalization 
opened the opportunity for New Zealand farmers to gain access to wider foreign markets. 
The global competition and lack of subsidies forced New Zealand producers to increase 
their efficiency and increase productivity to successfully compete in the global market 
(Evans & Meade, 2006). The removal of subsidies led to major change, adjustment and 
enhancement in productivity and quality in the agriculture industry (Evans, 2012). The 
producers of agricultural products in New Zealand have adapted to market changes by 
forming co-operatives to join forces and increase their competitiveness.. Therefore, it is 
the preferred type of organization in the agricultural sector (Rudzki & Davidson, 2002). 
 
The earliest co-operative in New Zealand was established in 1844 in Riwaka, a small 




operatives in New Zealand was laid in 1871 when the first dairy co-operative was 
established. It was the Otago Peninsula Cheese Factory located in Springfield, near 
Dunedin. The founders consisted of eight suppliers that gained shares according to the 
amount of milk each could supply (Morris, 2017). The first farmers’ trading co-operatives 
were established in 1881 in Timaru and Christchurch. The co-operative form of 
organization has been adopted  by many dairy producers and, in 2002, Rudzki and 
Davidson (2002) state that 40% of 124 dairy factories in New Zealand had a co-operative 
form.In 2001, Fonterra was established by the merger of two major dairy co-operatives 
in New Zealand which were the New Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi Dairies (Murray, 
2016). The evolution of New Zealand co-operatives has been summarized by Garnevska 
et al. (2017) and is presented in Table 1. 
 
The growth of co-operatives in New Zealand has been supported by several organizations, 
including the Co-operatives Business New Zealand. Previously, the organization was 
known by the New Zealand Agricultural Co-operatives Association which was developed 
in 1984 (Morris, 2017). Co-operatives in New Zealand are also supported by the Co-
operatives Companies Act 1996, legislation that is flexible enough to enable New Zealand 
co-operatives to modify their form and objectives according to their needs (Evans & 
Meade, 2006). Co-operatives are acknowledged as being similar to investor-owned firms, 
but differ in the tax treatment of dividends and variations of company rules that allow the 
co-operative structure (Evans, 2012). 
 
Table 1. Evolution of Co-Operatives and Mutuals in New Zealand 
Year Event 
1846 First dairy exports from New Zealand 
1869 Southland Building, Land and Investment Society (now SBS Bank) 
forms 
1871 The first Dairy co-operative in NZ is registered in Otago 
1908 The Industrial and Provident Societies Act is passed 
1920-1940 Emergence of 600 dairy factories, of which 85% are co-operatives. 
Emergence of co-operatives in other sectors (e.g. Medical Assurance 
Society, Foodstuffs , Market Gardeners, Electricity Ashburton, CDC, 
Co-operative Bank) 
1940-1980 Continued emergence of co-operatives and mutuals in various sectors 
(e.g. Alliance Group, Farmlands Co-operative Society, Ashburton 
Trading Society, New Zealand Plumbers & Merchants Society, Mitre 




1984 New Zealand Agricultural Co-operatives Association (now known as 
Co-operative Business New Zealand) is formed. 
1996 The Co-operative Companies Act passes into law 
2012 United Nations lists New Zealand as the most co-operative economy 
as part of the International Year of Co-operatives 
Source: (Garnevska et al., 2017) 
 
According to Woodford (2008), the agricultural co-operatives in New Zealand could be 
classified into three business structures and two business functions. The business 
structures are traditional, capitalist and hybrid. The capitalist structures have the 
mechanism for capital gain on the shares held by members, while traditional co-operatives 
do not. Hybrid co-operatives have two types of shares, which are transactor shares and 
investor shares. Only the transactor shares are entitled to vote in the co-operative. To 
retain the co-operative, form, according to the Co-operatives Companies Act, 60% of the 
voting shares must be held by the transacting members. The business functions of co-
operatives could be separated by input supply and product marketing. However, the 
distinction of the two is not so clear in New Zealand co-operatives since many developed 
co-operatives are operating these two functions at the same time.  Fonterra, for example, 
as the largest milk producer and marketing co-operative, also has an input supply division 
(Woodford, 2008).  
 
2.2. Global Competitiveness of New Zealand Agricultural Co-operatives  
In New Zealand (NZ), The co-operative sector makes up a large part of the NZ economy. 
The top 30 co-operatives and mutuals contributed 17.5% revenue to NZ GDP in 2015, as 
shown in Table 2. The largest sector is Agri-food co-operatives that contribute around 
$43 billion to the NZ economy. This is worth 65.2 percent of revenue, 67.6 percent of 





Table 2 . Top 30 co-operatives by revenue 2015 in New Zealand 
 
Source: (Garnevska et al., 2017) 
 
In 2012, the United Nations listed New Zealand as the most co-operative economy in the 
world (Garnevska et al., 2017). According to the Global Census on co-operatives 
organized by The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New 
Zealand has been placed as number one in both its Co-operative Economy and Social 
Progress categories. The top four countries with cooperatives that contribute more than 
10% of the national GDP are New Zealand (20%), Netherlands (18%), France (18%) and 
Finland (14%) (Dave Grace & Associates, 2014). 
 
There are three ratios used to measure the social and economic impacts of co-operatives. 
These are: 





 employment by co-operatives relative to total population (i.e. 
employment/population) 
 annual gross revenue or turnover of all co-operatives in a country relative to the 
country’s GDP (NZ.coop, 2014) 
 
The International Co-operative Alliance released the top 300 global co-operatives’ report 
in 2011 which included several sectors:  insurance (41%), agriculture (30%), wholesale 
and retail trade (19%), banking and financial services (6%), industry and utilities (1%), 
health, education and social care (1%) and other services (1%). Fonterra, as the largest 
dairy co-operative in NZ, is ranked 33 with a US$11.34 billion revenue. It  ranked 9th 
among the co-operatives in the agricultural sector only (ICA, 2014). By 2015, Fonterra 
had increased its revenue to US$ 13.05, but fell to the 40th position among other global 
co-operatives, and 10th among the agricultural co-operatives (ICA, 2015). Other New 
Zealand agricultural co-operatives listed in the top 300 global co-operatives are 
Foodstuffs North Island, Foodstuffs South Island, Zespri, Silver Fern Farms, and the 
Alliance Group (ICA, 2018).  
 
In the global market, the EU is still the biggest player in the food and agricultural sector. 
The co-operatives in this sector comprises around 13.4% of the total volume of business 
and provides 13.5% of employment (Juliá-Igual, Meliá-Martí, & García-Martinez, 2012). 
Agricultural co-operatives in the EU have progressed into a new internationalization 
phase. They have begun to internationalize their membership by becoming transnational 
co-operatives. They expand their co-operatives by inviting farmers from foreign countries 
to become members (Bijman, Pyykkönen, & Ollila, 2014). Arla Foods is one of the most 
transnational agricultural cooperatives in the EU. Arla was established in the year 2000 
by the merger of MD Foods from Denmark and Arla from Sweden. Now, it has members 
in Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Belgium, UK, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
Another large transnational cooperative is also from the EU and is in the dairy sector. The 
co-operative is the Friesland Campina which is based in the Netherlands having members 
in three countries: Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium (Bijman et al., 2014). Meanwhile, 
in NZ, the practice of transnational co-operatives has not yet been considered as their 





Murray (2016) believes that the small population and isolated location is one factor that 
differentiates the co-operatives in New Zealand from the other agricultural co-operatives 
around the world. This condition allows the members of the co-operative to have a more 
intensive engagement and participation among them. This grassroots’ approach is a strong 
base that helps them to face the challenges of internationalization in the global market.  
Considering the small size of the local market, it could be said that New Zealand co-
operatives are born-globals by nature because they must conduct international trade to 
grow their business (Gray & Heron, 2010). The global growth of co-operatives in New 
Zealand is also supported by the Government, especially when the Co-operative 
Companies Act passed into law in 1996. The co-operative legislation in New Zealand is 
flexible and neutral where the co-operatives are considered as the same business structure 
as the other investor-oriented firms, so they have the same opportunity to internationalize 
as the other forms of business (Woodford, 2008).  
 
History has shown that exporting was the earlier entry-mode choice of agricultural co-
operatives’ internationalization in New Zealand (Morris, 2017). However, exporting is 
not the only choice for them. Fonterra, as the biggest co-operative in New Zealand, has 
internationalized its business into the global market.  This includes an alliance with Nestlé 
in North, Central and South America, joint ventures with Arla Foods in Great Britain, a 
joint venture with Dairy Farmers of America, a joint venture in India, a joint venture in 
Mexico, a merger in Australia and other forms of internationalization (Evans & Meade, 
2006; Donoso, 2003; Fonterra, 2018). Fonterra’s products are distributed and traded to 
140 countries globally, it operates 30 manufacturing sites in New Zealand and has 
35 additional locations throughout the world (Fonterra, 2018). An ealier study by Donoso 
(2003) revealed that, although Fonterra is a truly multinational company with wholly-
owned subsidiaries and joint venture companies spread over the world, exporting is still 
Fonterra's main foreign markets’ service mode. This is an interesting fact that could be 
further studied, particularly whether it would be still relevant after more than ten years 
have passed, especially with the advancement of innovation and technology.  
 
2.3. New Zealand Dairy Industry 
New Zealand is the eighth largest milk producer worldwide, producing 3% of the milk in 
the world (NZIER, 2017). NZ dairy companies processed 20.7 billion litres of milk 




milksolids in 2016/2017 was 41% higher than in 2006/2007, but there was a decrease by 
0.6% from the last season (DairyNZ & LIC, 2017). 
 
New Zealand is the world’s largest exporter of dairy products. About 95% of New 
Zealand’s dairy products are exported overseas. New Zealand exported the dairy products 
mostly to the top five countries which are China, United States, United Arab Emirates, 
Australia, and Japan ([DCANZ], 2018). Dairy farming contributed 35% of New 
Zealand’s total primary industry export value (NZIER, 2017). New Zealand exported 19.1 
billion litres of milk and 1,658 million kilograms of milksolid worth $13.4 billion in 
2016/2017 (DairyNZ, 2017). The percentage of export for each dairy product category 
can be seen in Table 3.  
Table 3 The Dairy Products Exports in New Zealand 2017 
Dairy Products Percentage of Export 
Milk Powder 38% 
Butter and Cream 17% 
Skim Milk, Buttermilk Powder, Infant Food 13% 
Casein, Protein products, albumin 13% 
Cheese 10% 
Yoghurt, Ice Cream, etc 9% 
Source: (DairyNZ, 2017) 
 
The total number of dairy herds in New Zealand is 11,748 with an average herd size of 
414, while the total number of the milking cows is 4.8 million in 2017 (NZIER, 2017). 
Most of the dairy herds are located in the North Island, with the greatest concentration 
situated in the Waikato region (28.8%). The number of herds in the South Island is only 
around 27%, however, they contain 40% dairy cows mainly located in North Canterbury 
(13.8%), Southland (11.6%) and Taranaki (9.7%) (DairyNZ & LIC, 2017) 
 
Table 4. Number of Dairy Herds in New Zealand 2017 
 North Island South Island 
Numbers of Herds 73% 27% 




Milksolids production 57% 43% 
Source: (NZIER, 2017) 
 
The dairy sector also plays an important role in providing employment in New Zealand. 
The total employment provided by the dairy industry is 47,310, where 71.4% people are 
working on farms and 28.6% people are working in the Processing and Wholesaling 
(Table 5).  
 
Table 5 New Zealand’s Employment in Dairy Sector 2017 
Dairy Employment Number of Employee 
On-Farm 33,760 
Processing and Wholesaling 13,550 
Total 47,310 
Source: (NZIER, 2017) 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the milk production in New Zealand was growing at an 
annual rate of 3.6%. In 2001, the annual growth became 2.8% since there were regulatory 
changes in the industry. In the past three years, the milk production growth has slowed 














Figure 1. Milk Production Growth in New Zealand 




Despite the slowing growth rate, from 2001 to 2017 the total milk volumes have grown 
by 52%, or around 470 million litres per year. For a highly perishable product that cannot 
be stored, that growth carries with it the consequence of having to invest in increased 
processing capacity for the forecast peak milk volumes. This level of growth means that 
it has been very difficult to do anything with the additional volume other than to channel 
it into commodity exports [TDB] (2018).  
 
The biggest market share of the milk industry in New Zealand is dominated by Fonterra 
as the largest dairy co-operative in New Zealand. It collects over 300 million litres of milk 
per year. The remaining milk goes to the other dairy industries, including Tatua Co-
operative with only a 1% share (Figure 2) [TDB] (2018). 
 
 
Figure 2. NZ Dairy Company’s Volume-based market share 
source: [TDB] (2018) 
 
2.4. New Zealand Red Meat Industry 
New Zealand has a strong position as a red meat exporter in the global market, especially 
for lamb and beef commodities. Around 70% of global lamb exports is supplied by New 
Zealand and Australia, where New Zealand represents more than a third of global trade 
(2017). Although New Zealand only produces around 1% of global beef production, it 
still occupies a strategic position in the top 15 of world beef producers (Table 6) and ranks 




































New Zealand exported more than one million tonnes of red-meat and co-products worth 
NZD 7 billion in 2017. This value is NZD 600 million less than the previous year as it 
was affected by a decline in beef price and exchange rate movements ([MIA], 2017). New 
Zealand’s meat is the second largest export commodity after dairy products, and around 
85% of the meat production is exported to 122 countries around the world ("Meat Industry 
Association," 2018).  
 
The biggest export market by volume, for beef, is USA and China followed by other 
Asian countries such as Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Hong Kong, as well as Canada 
and French Polynesia (Figure 3). The major export market by volume for lamb is China, 





Source: (USDA, 2017) 


























The beef cattle number in 2017, with a total of 3.63 million head, increased 2.8% from 
2016. On the other hand, the value of beef and veal exports in 2017-2018 was forecasted 
to decrease by 1.9% and decrease by 0.9% in volume. However, the total export receipts 
were forecasted to remain high at $3.3 billion FOB, even though they decreased  by 2.1% 
from the previous season (B+LNZ, 2017). 
 
Figure 4. New Zealand lamb Exports’ Destination by Volume 
source:("Lamb Exports by Country - New Zealand," 2018) 
 
Figure 3 New Zealand Beef Exports’ Destination by Volume 





Table 7 New Zealand Beef and Veal Exports 2013-2018 
 
source: (Beef+Lamb New Zealand, 2018) 
 
The total sheep number in 2017 was 27.3 million, decreasing by 0.9% from the previous 
year. Lamb exports were expected to increase 0.5% in volume and 0.9% in value. 
Meanwhile, the total lamb meat exports were expected to increase 1.3% on the previous 









source: (Beef+Lamb New Zealand, 2018) 
 
There are top four red meat processors who account for 75% of the beef and lamb 
production in New Zealand. The top processors are the Alliance Group, Silver Fern 
Farms, ANZCO and AFFCO. Among them, the Alliance Group is the only 100% farmer-
owned co-operative in New Zealand (Tatua, 2017). The Alliance Group is processing 
30% of New Zealand’s sheep meat, 30% of New Zealand’s venison, and 10% of New 









CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1.Internationalization 
3.1.1.  Definition of Internationalization 
Welch and Luostarinen (1988) argued that the term internationalization itself is not 
clearly defined. A broad description is outward movement in an individual firm’s or 
larger grouping’s international operations. A broader concept must be adopted since 
both inward and outward movements are closely linked in the dynamics of 
international trade. Welch and Luostarinen (1988) then define internationalization as 
the process of increasing involvement in international operations. Another definition 
given by Calof and Beamish (1995) says internationalization involves a firm’s 
operational adjustment in strategy, structure, and resources to an international 
environment. 
 
In terms of economic activities and trade, Theuvsen and Ebneth (2005, p. 5) define 
internationalization as “the process by which an economy, an industry or a company 
becomes increasingly integrated into international economic activities.” Based on 
these definitions, the internationalization process includes cross-country transactions 
of products, services or resources.  
 
3.1.2. Motive of Internationalization 
The factors driving a firm’s internationalization might be internal, where the 
company has an orientation towards overseas markets, or external from the 
competitive business environment and globalization (Jane, 2012). Grünig and 
Morschett (2017) identify seven drivers of internationalization: 
1. the need to find new customers in order to create additional turnover and 
contribution margin  
2. the need to reach economic scale  
3. access to low-cost raw materials and labor 
4. balancing risk 
5. the desire to gain new competencies 





7.  strategic power to apply price pressure on locally-based competitors in specific 
countries or put pressure on suppliers, customers, and even governments 
 
3.1.3. Internationalization Theories 
The internationalization process of business has been explained by several theories 
that have evolved over time. Several recognized theories of internationalization are 
summarized in Table 9 and will be elaborated further in this section. 
 
Table 9 Internationalization Theories 
Internationalization 
Theory 
Introduced by Concept Critics 
Absolute Advantage 
Theory (1776) 
Adam Smith A country gains 
from production 





(Ingham (2004) as 
cited in 
(Rastorgueva, 2014) 
It does not consider 
the situation when 
one of the trading 
countries has no 






David Ricardo When a country 
produces goods for a 
lower opportunity 
cost than other 
countries. One 
country might not be 
the most efficient 
producer of a good, 
but the good has a 
lower opportunity 
cost for other 
countries to import 
(Hunt, 2002) 
It only takes into 
account one factor of 
production which is 
the labor. It also does 
not explain the trade 
between almost 
identical countries 
where there are no 
relative advantages 
over another (Hunt, 
2002) 
 





Product enters a 
foreign market 
depending on the 
current position of 
the product life-
cycle. A product 
initially begins to 
grow in the local 
market then 
gradually expands to 
the international 
It contains no 
adequate 
conceptualisation of 
either the functioning 
of the enterprise or 
the interaction of the 

















Development of firm 
in the foreign market 
is based on a 
sequential 




This model is too 
deterministic. it does 
not take into account 
the mutual 
commitment among 
countries. It just 
considered them as 
separate entities and 
the operational and 










resources and apply 
company’s 
knowledge-based 
activities to produce 
and process 
efficiently (Buckley 
and Casson (1976) 
It focuses on external 
imperfections of 
knowledge transfer 
and internal cost 
minimization but fails 
to assess the true 
costs of international 
operations (Rugman, 
1980) 





Critical factors in 
determining 
international 
patterns of trade are 
economies of scale 
and network effects. 
This model also 
introduced that the 
firms who enter the 
market earlier gain 
economies of scale 
which will create 
entry barriers for 
other firms. 
(Krugman, 1979). 




domination in the 
market (Rastorgueva, 
2014) 






integration could be 
acquired using the 
strength of network 
involvement (Ojala, 
2009). 
It denies the role of 
the state and other 
institutions that 
should remain a key 
international player 
because networks can 
only operate 
effectively with the 













Porter explained that 
competition is 
driven by five 
competitive forces 










firm behaviour and 
rivalry (Porter, 
1993) 
The model does not 
work well when it 
turns to forecasting 
outcomes and very 
few verifiable 
predictions are made 
which is not 














seeks to derive 
significant 
competitive 
advantage from the 
use of resources and 




It has little to no 
productivity 
advantage and exhibit 
no long-term growth 
lead compared to 




Sala, and Schröder 
(2017) 
 
The internationalization concepts are developed based on several traditional theories of 
international trade. The underlying theory of international trade was introduced by Adam 
Smith. His theory is known as the absolute advantage theory. If a country could produce 
a product with less cost per unit, it has the absolute advantage of the product. Trade 
happens with another country who has an absolute advantage over a different product 
(Ingham, 2004 in Rastorgueva, 2014) 
 
However, the absolute advantage theory did not consider the situation if one of the trading 
countries has no absolute advantage in any commodity. In response to that, David Ricardo 
developed the absolute advantage theory and introduced the comparative advantage 
theory. He stated that a country could gain from international trade if it has a comparative 




a lower opportunity cost than other countries. One country might not be the most efficient 
producer of a good, but the good has a lower opportunity cost for other countries to import 
(Hunt, 2002). The limitation of the comparative advantage theory is it only takes into 
account one factor of production which is the labor. It also does not explain the trade 
between almost identical countries where there is no relative advantage over another. 
 
In response to the theory of comparative advantage, Raymond Vernon (1966) introduced 
the international product life-cycle theory in 1966. This theory explained that a product 
would enter a foreign market depending on the current position of the product life-cycle 
which differs between countries (Raymond Vernon, 1966). The product life-cycle theory 
suggests that a product initially begins to grow in the local market then gradually expands 
to the international market. As the demand for a product increases, product 
standardization usually takes place. If the growth rates declined when the product 
matured, export to foreign market would begin. As the sales in the foreign market grow, 
later on, the production will be established in the importing countries to respond to the 
demand. To avoid the decline in production later in the cycle, the product should be 
continuously upgraded with innovation for differentiation to survive the competition.  
 
There are several factors that affect production in the foreign market which are economies 
of scale, tariffs, transportation costs, the income elasticity of demand for the product, and 
the income level and size of the foreign market. Vernon divided products into three 
categories based on the product-cycle, which are new product, maturing product and 
standardized product (Vernon, 1979). A critique on this model has been addressed by 
Taylor (1986). He stated that the product-cycle model contains no adequate 
conceptualization of either the functioning of the enterprise or the interaction of the 
enterprise with its external environment. 
 
The internationalization theory, also known as the Uppsala Model, was originally 
formulated at Uppsala University in Sweden in the mid-1970s. This theory explained that 
development of firms in the foreign market is based on a sequential establishment chain. 
Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) have identified four stages in the 
internationalization process theory: 
(1) No regular export activities, business develops in the local market 




(3) Sales subsidiary 
(4) Production/manufacturing in the foreign market  
 
These stages show increased commitment to the market because the firms gain greater 
experience and knowledge (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Based on the Uppsala model, the 
firms initially begin by exporting to physically close countries that they know better and 
have similar business practices (Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). However, since 
the globalization era, there was a behavioral shift that firms began their export to 
psychologically close countries. Firms are likely to export towards markets with the 
bigger market opportunity for their product (Bell & Young, 1998).  
 
Even though the Uppsala model has been widely used as the basic reference for 
internationalization theories, however, it is also the subject of several critiques. The model 
has been criticized as being too deterministic and it does not take into account the mutual 
commitment among countries. It just considered them as separate entities and the 
operational and theoretical model are not congruent (Rastorgueva, 2014). Responding to 
the critiques, a number of authors have contributed to the enhancement of this model 
(Forsgren, 2002; Jeryl, 2002; J. Johanson & Vahlne, 2009; Vahlne & Johanson, 2017). 
Recently Vahlne and Johanson (2017) developed it into a general model of the evolution 
of the multinational business enterprise. This model describes the evolution of a firm 
starting from the first steps abroad to being a global firm. 
 
Buckley and Casson (1976) introduced the general theory of market internalization which 
further developed the idea of Multi-National Enterprises. The internalization theory sees 
that the firms should internalize the resources and apply company’s knowledge-based 
activities to produce and process efficiently. The internalized bundle of resources can be 
allocated between product groups and between national markets (Buckley & Casson, 
1998). The internalization theory by Buckley and Casson (1976) also consider the option 
of licensing to enter a foreign market. Licensing is located in the foreign market and 
contractually controlled while exporting is located domestically and administratively 
controlled. 
 
Buckley and Cason (1976) focus on the imperfections in intermediate product markets 




and its cost determines the boundaries of the firm and leads to the growth of firm by 
internalization. Johanson and Vahlne (1977) believe that the internationalization is the 
product of a series of incremental decisions. The market internalization across national 
boundaries will create multinational enterprises (MNE). The MNE is defined as an 
enterprise that owns and controls activities in different countries in which they are 
incorporated (Buckley & Casson, 1976).  
 
The general internalization theory has been further criticised by Rugman (1980). He 
points out that the weaknesses of the conventional internalization theory are; it focuses 
on external imperfections of knowledge transfer and internal cost minimization but fails 
to assess the true costs of international operations. Rugman introduces the three options 
for companies to consider explicitly the relative costs of servicing foreign markets. First 
by exporting, then the firm may engage in foreign direct investment (setting of 
subsidiary), and third, the firm may license to a possible host country producer (Rugman, 
1980).  
 
New trade theory (NTT) was introduced by Paul Krugman in 1979. He suggests that a 
critical factor in determining international patterns of trade are economies of scale 
and network effects that can occur in key industries. Economies of scale happen when one 
unit cost reduction associated with a large scale of output. The NTT also introduced the 
idea that the firms that enter the market earlier gain economies of scale which will create 
entry barriers for other firms. The competition is likely to be dominated by the incumbent 
firms who entered the market early, which leads to a form of monopolistic competition 
(Krugman, 1979).  
 
The idea of this theory is that it might be beneficial for countries that have the competitive 
advantage in producing some goods to protect the trade of their products, and this will 
increase the economic position of the firm. Those companies that can produce more of a 
specific product at lower cost than their rivals may exploit comparative advantage and 
dominate in the market (Rastorgueva, 2014). 
 
While the Uppsala Model introduced the concept that internationalization is a gradual 
process, the network theory suggests that firms do not necessarily develop in a linear 




Mattsson, proposes that the internationalization process is seen as a development of the 
network relationships of a firm. The network shows how the relationships among 
customers, suppliers, competitors and other players in the market stimulate the firm to go 
international.  In the internationalization process, the international extension happens 
because of strong relationships in the network. The firms then penetrate to a foreign 
market by gaining trust and increased commitment while establishing the foreign 
network. After successfully penetrating the foreign market, international integration 
could be acquired using the strength of network involvement. 
 
The success of a firm to internationalize depends on the relationship of both local and 
international markets (Coviello & Munro, 1995). Building a network is important as a 
source of knowledge and market information. It is also useful to build reputation and 
competence, as well as gain access to resources. Resources that are under control of other 
companies could be accessed by expanding the business by utilizing the power of 
networking (Rastorgueva, 2014). However, scholars have criticized the network model 
because it denies the role of the state and other institutions that should be recognized as 
key international players because networks can only operate effectively with the support 
of state and hierarchical institutions of governance (Joseph, 2010). 
 
Another contribution to the internationalization theory is introduced by Michael Porter. 
His earlier theory identified that competition is driven by five competitive forces which 
are the threat of entry, the threat of substitutes, the power of buyers, the power of suppliers 
and competitive rivalry (Porter, 1979). He outlines the importance of strategy formulation 
to face the competition. In Diamond theory, Porter explained four broad categories: 
factors of production, demand conditions in the home market, related and supporting 
industries, characteristics of firm behaviour and rivalry. Economic success is defined as 
continuous productivity improvements through upgrading of skills and of goods sold. The 
generic activities are creating a value chain to sustain competitive advantage. According 
to him, competitive advantage could be achieved by cost-effective activities, better 
coordination and value. (Porter, 1990).  
 
Porter considers configuration and coordination as the important factors in international 
competition. Configuration is the place where each of the activities in the value chain take 




which are  export-based strategy, country-centered strategy, high-foreign investment, and 
purest global (Porter, 1993). So, the company should create a strategy in order to have a 
good performance. Porter claims that these tools are: cost leadership, differentiation, and 
focus (Porter, 1990). Critiques of Porter’s model consider that the model does not work 
well when it turns to forecasting outcomes and very few verifiable predictions are made 
which are not structured within a general equilibrium framework (Waverman, 1995). 
 
Oviatt and McDougall (1994) argue that existing internationalization theories do not 
explain the formation of International New Venture (INV) models. They introduced the 
model of INV that can be defined as “a business organization that, from inception, seeks 
to derive significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and the sale of 
outputs in multiple countries‟ (Oviatt & McDougall, 1994, p. 49). The INV model mainly 
applies to the young small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which expand rapidly and 
start internationalization from start-up. This is supported  by Knight and Cavusgil (1996) 
who stated that these are small firms that operate their business based on technology to 
achieve a global competitive advantage. The earlier theories suggest a gradual stage of 
internationalization, and different stages need a certain skill that builds the company’s 
knowledge. Meanwhile, the INV skip these stages and enter the foreign market 
immediately. Therefore, it has a different approach to learning and knowledge 
accumulation (Zahra, 2005).  
 
Oviatt and McDougall (1994) identify four INV types: Export Start-up, Geographically 
Focused Start-up, Multinational Trader, and Global Start-up.  Each of the types need a 
different strategy and approach towards internationalization. In the INV model, firms use 
factors of founder-entrepreneurs’ knowledge to internationalize rapidly (Oviatt & 
McDougall, 2005). Madsen and Servais (1997) also believe the factors that help the 
internationalization from inception are new market conditions, technological 
developments and the capabilities of managerial teams and/or entrepreneurs as well as 
the international network relationships. Masum and Fernandez (2008) added that these 
firms have innovative or unique products or services in a specific foreign market giving 
them a competitive advantage compared to the other company.  
 
The INV model is also known as “born-global”, these are firms which focus on the global 




associated with young, innovative, high-tech or knowledge-intensive firms (Scott-
Kennel, 2013). Choquette et al. (2017) defined born-global as firms that have reached a 
share of foreign sales of at least 25% after having started export activities within three 
years of their birth. They found in their study that born-globals have little to no 
productivity advantage compared to firms with less or later internationalization. 
 
In conclusion, the internationalization models could be classified as two types which are 
traditional and emergent (Scott-Kennel, 2013). The earlier internationalization theories 
were traditional models described as a slow process starting from the local market 
developing later into the international market. Scholars are developing the 
internationalization theories as the internationalization of firms evolved over time. In 
recent times, companies do not only internationalize in a gradual process. This could be 
identified as emergent internationalization models where some companies are born global 
form the start.  
 
3.1.4.  Internationalization Strategy 
If a firm wants to explore the international market, it has to carefully choose the 
internationalization strategies from the various forms of entry modes. Foreign entry mode 
is a structural agreement that allows a firm to carry out its business activities in a foreign 
market with its resources and market strategy (Shen et al., 2017). A foreign market entry 
mode is "an institutional arrangement that makes possible the entry of a company's 
products, technology, human skills, management or other resources into a foreign 
country" (Root, 1987, p. 5). Calof and Beamish (1995) define entry mode as the 
institutional arrangements that allow firms to use their product(s) or services in a country. 
In this study, the entry modes approaches will be addressed as internationalization 
strategy which include indirect & direct export, subsidiary, joint venture, and 
license/franchise. 
 
The internationalization strategy is a complex and important decision to be made with 
various factors to be considered. An appropriate internationalization strategy will lead not 
only to higher performance of the subsidiaries but also to the accomplishment of the 
parent firm’s objective (Shen et al., 2017). Anderson and Gatignon (1986) have analyzed 
the transaction cost considered by firms for each choice of internationalization strategy 




state that there are non-behavioral and behavioral determinants that affect the decision of 
internationalization strategy. The nonbehavioral determinants depend on the product 
characteristics, firm characteristics, as well as external environment. The behavioral 
factors include a business’s knowledge and perception of the foreign market . Market 
knowledge can be defined as the knowledge relating to the market and the market-
influencing factors (Johanson and Vahlne,1977).  
 
Based on the earlier theory, firms start to enter a foreign market by exporting before 
developing the other forms of international involvement. However, this has changed 
because firms began to internationalize with an inward technology transfer such as 
licensing agreements with parties in export markets, franchising, acquisition, and joint 
venture. Thus, exporting is not always the preferred strategy. The choice of strategy will 
be influenced by external and internal factors (Bell & Young, 1998). 
 
According to Rugman (1980), there are several stages of a typical penetration of a foreign 
market: licensing, exporting, establishment of local warehouses and direct local sales, 
local assembly and packaging, formation of a joint venture, and foreign direct investment 
(full scale local production and marketing by a wholly owned subsidiary). Meanwhile, 
Harrison et al. (2000) considered these internationalization strategies as several entry 
mode choices as described in Table 10. 
 
Table 10 Internationalization Strategies 
Business 
Activities 







Export: Firms directly sells goods or services 
produced in the home country to a foreign country 
Import: Firms directly bringing in goods or services 




Export: Firms sells goods or services produced at 
home to a foreign country either through 
intermediaries or by selling it to another domestic 
manufacturer 
Import: domestic manufacturer using a foreign 







A form of FDI where a firm builds its operations 
from the ground up enabling control over its assests, 








A form of investment which a company buys most, if 
not all, of another firm's ownership stakes in a foreign 
country to assume control of it 
 Joint venture 
 
A form of investment arranged by two or more firms 
in foreign country characterized by shared ownership, 






A form of market entry involving two firms in which 
the licenser agrees to sell to the licensee the right to 
use the licener’s intellectual property for a specified 
period of time in return for an agreed fee or royalty 
 Franchising A form of licensing arrangement whereby the owner 
of intellectual property agrees to allow the franchisee 
to use the franchiser’s intellectual property such as 
trademark, brand name, marketing technique, or 
particular business system to undertake a business 
activity in a manner specified by the franchiser in a 




A type of licensing agreement between the firm and 
another firm whereby the contracting firm makes 
available its managerial expertise and a part of its 
management personnel in training local managers for 
the efficient operation of a project in return for an 
agreed fee 
 Turnkey Project A term used to describe an agreement under which a 
firm undertakes to design, build, equip, and train 
personnel to operate an entire production or service 
facility before turning it over to its owner 
Source: Harrison et al. (2000) 
 
In addition to that, the different strategies of internationalization have been compared and 
analyzed by Buckley and Casson (1998) who introduced an integrated analysis which is 
able to compare each strategy between exporting, licensing, joint venturing (JV) and 
wholly owned foreign direct investment (FDI). The choice between acquisition and 
greenfield investment is examined, and so too are options based on subcontracting and 
franchising. In this model, they have identified twelve entry strategies and their variants. 
Figure 5 shows the entry strategies based on the ownership of the business distinguished 
by rows, the location of production and distribution distinguished by columns, as well as 
the final demand. The strategies indicated by the numbers 1-12 in the figure are further 
explained in Table 11. This model can be useful in making the right internationalization 
strategy decisions for the company. Companies might have different choices of entry 
mode, but according to Bell and Young (1998), the suitable strategy for each business is 






Figure 5 Twelve Entry Strategies and Their Variants 
source: Buckley and Casson (1998)  
 
Table 11 Twelve Internationalization Strategies and Their Variants 
No Type Description Variants 
1 Normal FDI Entrant owns foreign 
production  
and distribution facilities 
1.1.Both facilities are 
greenfield  
1.2.Both facilities are 
acquired 
1.3.Production is greenfield 




production is acquired 
2 FDI in production Entrant owns foreign 
production but uses 
independent distribution 
facilities 
2.1. Production is greenfield 
2.2. Production is acquired 
 
3 Subcontracting Entrant owns foreign 
distribution but uses 
indepenent production 
facilities 
3.1. Distribution is 
greenfield 
3.2. Distribution is acquired 
 
4 FDI in Distribution Entrant exports to own 
distribution facility 
 
5 Exporting/Franchising Entrant exports to 






6 Licensing  Entrant transfers technology 
to independent integrated 
firms 
 
7 Integrated JV Entrant jointly owns an 
integrated set of production 
and distribution facilities 
 
8 JV in production Entrant jointly owns foreign 




9 JV in distribution Entrant jointly owns 
distribution facilities but 
subcontract production to 
independent facility 
 
10 JV exporting Entrant exports to jointly 
owned distribution facility 
 
11 FDI/JV combination Entrant owns foreign 
production but jointly owned 
foreign distribution 
11.1. Production is 
greenfield 
11.2. Production is acquired 
 
12 JV/FDI combination Entrant owns foreign 
distribution but jointly owned 
foreign production 
12.1. Distribution is 
greenfield 
12.2. Distribution is 
acquired 
 
Source: Buckley and Casson (1998) 
 
A more recent study explained that the final internationalization strategy decision is 
influenced by some uncertainty dimensions, economic dimensions, strategy dimensions, 
and resources & capabilities dimension as shown in Figure 6. The factors that determine 
the strategy dimension come from the investment level, while economic dimensions are 
related to the local market/industry level. The resources & capabilities dimensions are  
internal factors considered by firms to plan their entry-mode choice. Meanwhile the 
uncertainty dimensions are external factors and usually come from the host country level; 





Figure 6 The Mapping of Foreign Market Entry Mode Determinants and Their 
Interrelationship 
Source: (Shen et al., 2017) 
 
3.1.1. The Risk and Challenges of Internationalization 
Erramilli and Rao (1990) believe that financial and managerial resources and the degree 
of the resource commitment are the challenges that are specific to the market and will 
define a firm's level of involvement in a foreign market. They believe that 
internationalization strategies differ based on the involvement of the firm in the foreign 
market. They have defined a model called the Level of Involvement (LI) to measure the 
participation or involvement of the firm. Table 12 describes the various 
internationalization strategy placed on the level of involvement and commitment scale.  
 











Very High High 9 (Highest) 
Wholly Owned 
Subsidiary Acquired 
High High 8 
Majority Joint 
Venture 




50-50 Joint Venture Moderate High 6 
Minority Joint 
Venture 
Moderate High 5 
Export Subsidiary Moderate Moderate 4 
Direct to Consumer 
Exports 
Low to Moderate Low 3 
Agent/Distributor 
Exports 
Low Low 2 
Licensing/Franchising Very Low Very Low 1 
 
Source: Erramilli and Rao (1990) 
 
Further, researches argue that strategies which require more intensive resources 
commitment are riskier because it involves greater financial exposure and requires more 
control mechanisms with greater complexity (Brouthers, 2002). Firms generally prefer an 
attractive but less risky market to gain high return. Therefore, risk perceptions also 
influence the decision of internationalization choice. Ahmed, Mohamad, Tan, and 
Johnson (2002) classified the internationalization choice of firms based on the 
international risk perception decribed in Table 13.  
 
Table 13 Internationalization choice based on international risk perception 
International Risk Perception Entry-Mode Choice 
High Wholly Owned subsidiary  
Moderate Joint Venture 
Low Non-equity / export 
Source: (Ahmed et al., 2002) 
 
Furthermore, an empirical study conducted in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria by 
Kraus, Ambos, Eggers, and Cesinger (2015) discovered that some risk determinants to be 
considered in the choice of country for international decisions include economic distance 
(36.1%), cultural distance (28.5%), political distance (20.8%), and geographic distance 
(11.0%). Their study revealed that firms consider distance dimensions as primary drivers 
of risk assessment, while internationalization strategy is considered after they choose the 
target market based on the risk profile.  
 
 
3.2. Internationalization in Agri-food Industry 




Agribusiness during the 20th century has been associated with farm activities related to 
immediately relevant supply inputs, production, processing, and distribution of single 
input or processed commodities such as milk, grain, fruits or vegetables (Edward & 
Shultz, 2005).  Edward & Shultz (2005) argue that in the 21st century, agribusiness has 
changed from farm to market centric. The agribusiness sector has become more dynamic 
and integrated between production, processing, distribution, and marketing 
communications driven by new demand, market changes, competition, and economic 
growth.  
 
The food and agribusiness industry, as an important sector in the global market, cannot 
avoid the effects of economic globalization. If companies in the agri-food sector want to 
survive in a competitive market, they need to apply internationalization strategies like 
companies in other sectors (Daniela & Bohumil, 2015). The global agri-food industry is 
in a process of radical transformation which could be called ‘the agro-industrialization 
process’ (M. L. Cook & Chaddad, 2000). This could be defined as the growth of 
processing, distribution, and farm input provisions off-farm that changes along with 
technological and market structure developments which also involve institutional and 
organizational changes (T. Reardon & Barrett, 2000). 
 
The agri-food industry transformation has developed in two stages. The first was pre-
globalization from the 1950s until early 1980s, during which investment transformed 
agriculture from traditional small-scale agri-food industry to a larger scale industrialized 
sector. The second stage was globalization which started in the early 1980s until today. 
In this stage,  trade liberalization, improvements in logistics, and foreign investment are 
happening (T. Reardon, Barrett, Berdegué, & Swinnen, 2009). Nevertheless, long before 
the development of the second stage, agri-food companies had been implementing 
internationalization practices that led to the development of big multinational companies 
dominating the agri-food sector such as Nestlé and Unilever.  
 
As activities in the agribusiness sector developed, Edward and Shultz (2005) proposed a 
new definition of agribusiness as a dynamic and systemic endeavor that serves consumers 
globally and locally through innovation and management of multiple value chains that 
deliver valued good and services derived from the sustainable orchestration of food, fiber, 




3.2.2. Internationalization Strategy of Agrifood Industry 
Multinational agri-food companies around the world have different strategies of 
internationalization. Filippaios and Rama (2008) have studied the geographic strategies 
of the world’s largest multinational food and beverage companies (F&B MNC) using data 
from around 7,000 affiliates of 81 F&B MNC, analyzed between 1996 and 2000. They 
found that only nine of the companies pursue a truly global strategy, 22 implement bi-
regional strategies and 50 implement home-region strategies where the core businesses 
are regionally, or home-base, focused. The regional strategies are the first step that later 
will lead to wider internationalization based on case studies of F&B MNCs in Latin 
America and South East Asia (Filippaios & Rama, 2008).  
 
The internationalization strategy choices of the agri-food companies are the same as 
industries in other sectors, which include exporting, licensing and franchising, strategic 
alliances and joint ventures and foreign direct investment. The foreign direct investments 
and joint ventures are considered as high risk because they requires higher investment 
compared to other strategies (Bijman et al., 2014).  
 
Several major agri-food multinational companies around the world such as Nestlé, 
Unilever, Tate and Lyle, the Phillip Morris food group, and General Mills are expanding 
their businesses in the international market mainly through acquisitions and joint ventures 
(Schroder, Wallace, & Mavondo, 1993). The history of Nestlé began in 1866, with the 
foundation of the Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk Company and the contemporaneous 
development of infant food in 1867 by Henri Nestlé. Competition developed between 
Nestlé and Anglo-Swiss, as both firms expanded sales and production abroad. However, 
in 1905 the companies decided to merge and became known as the Nestlé Group. In 1905, 
Nestlé & Anglo Swiss had more than 20 factories, and the Nestlé group began using 
overseas subsidiaries to establish a sales network that now spans Africa, Asia, Latin 
America and Australia. As World War One approached, the firm benefitted from the 
period of prosperity known as the Belle Époque or ‘Beautiful Age’, and became a global 
dairy company. In 1914, the company acquired processing facilities in the US and 
Australia, and by the end of the war it had 40 factories. Acquisitions enabled Nestlé to 
enter fast-growing new areas and develop a wide range of brands (Nestle, 2018). Through 
their preferred entry mode of acquisitions and joint ventures, Nestlé has acquired 413 





Meanwhile, Unilever was founded in 1929 by the merger of two major companies, 
Margarine Unie and Lever Sunlight. By 1930, a third major company merged with 
Unilever: the United Africa Company (UAC). In the early years, Unilever developed into 
a company with worldwide activities. It built or purchased factories in Japan (1909), 
Argentina (1928), Brazil (1929), Thailand and Indonesia (1932), and India (1933). 
Between 1945 and 1980, expansion of Unilever’s activities took place mostly in Europe. 
Since 1980, Unilever has kept expanding worldwide in selected core-product activities 
by performing important acquisitions and establishing subsidiaries (Elshof, 2005). 
Unilever owns over 500 factories operating in 98 countries around the world (Unilever, 
2018) 
 
Since the 1980s, companies have been affected by the fast development of information 
and communication technologies (ICT). It offers more convenient and cost-saving 
approaches to communication that improve busines relations in the global market (Çetin, 
Akpinar, & Ozsayin, 2004). ICT contributes to the acceleration of internationalization 
processes and  influences the entry-mode choices of exporting agri-food companies 
(Serrano & Acero, 2015). The development of the internet, especially the emergence of 
e-commerce that can be used as a direct sales channel, could be modifying firms’entry 
mode choices and could be one of the ways for rapid internationalization to occur 
(Gabrielsson and Kirpalani, 2004).  
 
3.2.3. The Motive of Internationalization 
Bijman et al. (2014) stated in their study that the internationalization motives of the 
European agrifood industry can be divided into external and internal motives. The first 
external motive is the increased competition because of food market liberalization. The 
second is the rapid development of food retailers, forcing the agrifood industry to speed 
up their internationalization. Third is the quality assurance and product development 
demanded by consumers, which often leads to a more international scale of operation. 
Meanwhile, the internal motives are resource seeking, market seeking, efficiency seeking 
and strategic asset seeking. 
 
The agri-food multinational companies (MNC) based in the developed countries are often 




market such as stagnant demographics, aging populations, declining income elasticities 
with growing income levels, and the shift of consumer taste and preferences (Filippaios 
& Rama, 2008). There is a need for companies to find new market opportunities in other 
countries to expand their business. The potential global market for agri-food industry is 
considered large since people around the world allocate 23% of their income to food 
(Selvanathan & Selvanathan, 2006).  
 
Besides widening the market, many large multinational companies aim to reduce costs 
and to create greater flexibility on the global market through internationalization to 
developing countries (Daniela & Bohumil, 2015). However, many contend that 
multinational companies aiming for cost reduction mainly exploit the environment, 
natural resources, low wages, and cheap labor in the developing countries (Beghin et al., 
2002, as cited in Vandeplas, Minten, and Swinnen, 2013). Another criticism of 
multinational expansion to developing countries is that it widens the social gap, bringing 
more benefit to the wealthy than the poor (Chen, Ge, & Lai, 2011). It has also been argued 
that the presence of multinational agri-food companies will harm local suppliers and 
farmers because of they are not competitive enough to meet the high grading and 
standards of the multinational agri-food companies (Reardon & Berdegue´, 2002). 
Similarly Baran (2016) concluded that the presence of agri-food multinational companies 
would harm the local small companies in Poland.  
 
On the contrary, other studies find that internationalization benefits local farmers and 
suppliers through vertical linkages with the multinational agri-food companies (Dries & 
Swinnen, 2004). Michael Porter and Mark Kramer introduced the concept of creating 
shared value in 2011, where companies operate their business while contributing to the 
social and economic conditions in the local communities. This concept has already been 
implemented by some of the largest multinational food companies in the world such as 
Nestlé, Unilever, and The Coca-Cola Company (Moore, 2014).  
 
Despite the arguments of the effect of multinational agri-food internationalization in 
developing countries, several studies have proved that internationalization has brought 
benefits to agri-food multinational companies. The global agri-food companies in Poland 
have experienced significant improvements in productivity, efficiency and foreign trade 




agri-food industry in Spain have also brought the benefit of export volume increase which 
keeps growing at a rapid rate, as analyzed by Serrano, García-Casarejos, Gil-Pareja, 
Llorca-Vivero, and Pinilla (2015) for the period 1970-2012. The food industry in 
Thailand has experienced the same result of internationalization since 1970. 
Opportunities in the global market are open through internationalization of the agri-food 
companies. Thailand experienced 26% export growth rate in 2008 which lead to Thailand 
becoming one of the world’s largest 15 food exporters from 2000 to 2008 according to 
World Trade Organization (Thirawat, Robins, & Baume, 2012). 
 
3.3.Co-operatives Theories 
3.3.1. Definition and Principles of Co-operatives 
ICA (n.d.) has defined a co-operative as “an autonomous association of persons united 
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations 
through a jointly owned and democratically-controlled enterprise.” Co-operatives are 
voluntarily formed by a group of people that have the same interest in both economic and 
social aspects, and each of the group members has equal rights in the business and share 
in the profits. In addition, the USDA (1987) in Bekkum (2001) defines co-operatives as 
user-owned and user-controlled that distribute benefit on the basis of use. It is based on 
three concepts; user-owner, user-control, and user-benefit. According to the USDA 
(2002), “ownership is expressed by equity investment in the enterprise and a claim on its 
assets. Control is the ability to exert authority over decision-making processes. Benefits 
available to cooperative members include both the right to receive services and to share 
in the earnings. Cooperatives must ensure that the benefits accrue to patrons on the basis 
of use”.  
 
Co-operatives are based on principles that determine the distinctive perspective of a co-
operative. The principles also served as a guideline to develop the organization. The ICA 
General Assembly held on 23rd September 1995 in Manchester, adopted the new 
Principles of Cooperation: 1) voluntary and open membership; 2) democratic member 
control;, 3) member economic participation; 4) autonomy and independence; 5) 
education, training and information; 6) co-operation among co-operatives; and 7) concern 





An earlier set of principles that is widely used is The Rochdale Principles, formed by The 
Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers. The principles  are 1) open membership; 2) 
democratic control; 3) distribution of the surplus to the members in proportion to their 
transactions; 4) limited interest on capital; 5) political and religious neutrality; 6) cash 
trading to avoid credit risk; 7) promotion of education (Fairbrain, 1994). These principles 
create values for co-operatives in operating their business. Co-operatives are based on the 
values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity. The 
ethical values implemented by the co-operative members are honesty, openness, social 
responsibility and caring for others (ICA, n.d.). 
 
Co-operatives are established to meet a wide range of needs, both economic and social. 
Schrader (1989) in Bekkum (2001) explains that the formation of co-operatives is a 
response to correction of market failures, capturing profits from up or downstream levels 
in production and marketing, provision of missing services, assurance of supplies, risk 
reduction, and building up of market power. Moreover, Van Dijk (1997) in Bekkum 
(2001) stated that the motives of co-operatives are countervailing power, securing market 
access, the realization of efficiency through economy of scale, risk management, and 
preservation of farm income. Co-operatives are also formed to acquire financial strength 
by implementing efficiency in business practice to reduce cost and marketing products 
(Merret & Walzer, 2001). The asymmetric information about agricultural commodities 
and prices also become a motivation to establish farmer marketing co-operatives 
(Hansmann, 1996). 
 
3.3.2.  Differences of Co-operatives 
The business practice of a co-operatives are similar to investor-owned companies, but 
there are several unique aspects that differentiate them (Barton, 1989). Co-operatives 
have a special characteristic where the members are also the owner of the co-operative. It 
has an aspect of patronage-based returns where those who own and formally control the 
organisation receive benefit from transactions and from their investment (Evans & 
Meade, 2006). 
 
The differences between co-operatives and other types of firm could be distinguished by 
the ownership structure, governance and the management system, the source of capital, 




members (M. L. Cook & F. R. Chaddad, 2004). This is also in accordance with F. 
Chaddad and Iliopoulos (2013) who said that ownership rights are restricted to the 
members of co-operatives. Two concepts that determine ownership are the residual 
returns and residual rights of control. In a co-operative, the members have effective 
control over assets and in making decisions within the business. The members are also 
entitled to the residual return rights of the net income generated by the co-operative with 
the equal amount of distribution based on patronage (F. Chaddad & Iliopoulos, 2013). 
 
The second difference is the governance and management system. Co-operatives in 
different regions implement various governance models and control rights. There are 
three generic governance models generally adopted by co-operatives which are 
integration (in the traditional model), separation (in the extended traditional model), and 
delegation (in the managerial and corporate models). The differences of these governance 
model are the degree of members control of decision making in the co-operative (F. 
Chaddad & Iliopoulos, 2013). In the traditional co-operative model, the governance 
model usually consists of the general assembly (GA), the board of directors (BoD) and, 
sometimes, supervisory committee (SC). Decision management functions are performed 
by the board of directors who are drawn from the co-operative’s members itself, without 
the involvement of professional or outside agents (F. Chaddad & Iliopoulos, 2013). 
 
In traditional co-operatives owners act as the managers and employees who have direct 
involvement in day-to-day business operations with different levels of control according 
to the type of co-operative. In traditional co-operatives, the one-member-one-vote rule is 
implemented (Barton, 1989). There will be no adjustment made upon the amount of 
patronage of each member (Hansmann, 1996). Meanwhile, in the new generation co-
operatives, there can be a separation between formal and effective control if the members 
sub-contract the administration of the co-operative professional managers (Evans & 
Meade, 2006).  
 
Another difference is the source of capital. Co-operatives generate internal capital from 
their members (Zheng, Wang, & O.Awokuse, 2012). The members of the co-operative 
each invest some amount of money, which the co-operative uses to operate the business. 
Co-operatives often require the members to make a long-term commitment to remain 




funds in the co-operative or retain some of its profit for internal investment and business 
development (Hansmann, 1996).  
 
In traditional co-operatives, the main source of funding for the co-operatives comes from 
the members. However, this means that generating capital for a co-operative to grow is 
one of the constraints of a co-operative (F. Chaddad & Heckelei, 2003). This is because 
the structure of a co-operative limits access to external funds, as it relies on the internal 
capital generated by members. Co-operatives could gain more capital through vertical 
integration or organizational transformation. This is one of the reasons that motivates co-
operatives to evolve their organizational form into a new generation co-operative that 
allows the co-operatives to acquire external equity capital and financial instruments 
(Nilsson & Ohlsson, 2007).  
 
The distribution of benefit is the other difference. The co-operatives have the patronage-
based returns aspect that distinguishes co-operatives from other forms of organization 
(Evans & Meade, 2006). The residual earnings in the co-operatives are distributed to the 
members in proportion to patronage (F. Chaddad & Iliopoulos, 2013). The firm’s net 
earning is then distributed pro rata among its members (Hansmann, 1996). In the 
traditional co-operatives, the residual returns are non-transferable to non-patrons, non-
appreciable and redeemable (F. Chaddad & Cook, 2002).  
 
3.3.3. New Co-operative Models 
Agricultural co-operatives used to be traditionally organized. The co-operatives were 
mainly collectively financed and governed. However, market pressure and competition 
have made traditional co-operatives struggle because of inefficiency. Scholars have 
critiqued the property right and agency problems such as free rider, limited portfolio, 
difficulty in decision making, and also horizon problems (Nilsson, 1999). To overcome 
the issues, these days the co-operatives have modified their organizational form and are 
going through a transformation to different entrepreneurial models (Nilsson, 1999). 
Agricultural co-operatives already acquire external equity capital and financial 
instruments that allow the members to invest voluntarily in the co-operative. The 
members were treated equally before, while nowadays different treatments of the 





Several factors influence the development of the co-operatives. Three main factors 
identified by Ingalsbe and Groves (1989) are: (1) economic conditions caused by war, 
depression, technology, government economic policy, etc. ; (2) farmer organizations 
including quality of their leadership, their motivation and enthusiasm to promote co-
operatives, power to influence public policy, etc.; and (3) public policy as determined by 
government interest, legislative initiative, and judicial interpretation. Influenced by 
various factors, the co-operatives are beginning to evolve into different structures. M. L. 
Cook and F. Chaddad (2004) identify four co-operative models with the ownership rights 
limited to member patrons (traditional co-operatives, proportional investment co-
operatives, member-investor co-operatives, and new-generation co-operatives) and three 
co-operative models with the ownership rights are not limited to member patrons (co-
operatives with capital seeking companies, investor-share co-operatives, and investor-
oriented firms).  
 
In a Proportional Investment Co-operative (PIC), the co-operative could gain capital from 
member patrons where the patrons are expected to provide proportional investment in the 
co-operative based on their patronage (Evans & Meade, 2005). The residual returns of 
PIC are non-transferable to non-patrons, non-appreciable and redeemable (M. L. Cook & 
F. Chaddad, 2004). One of the reasons that traditional co-operatives change their 
organizational form into a proportional investment co-operative is because of the increase 
of the member patrons’ heterogeneity. A proportional investment co-operative can 
maintain the alignment of the member patrons’ interest,   (M. L. Cook & F. Chaddad, 
2004). The next co-operative model is a Member-Investor Co-operative, which offers a 
co-operative to grow by adding capital not only from member patrons but also from 
investors (M. L. Cook & F. Chaddad, 2004). The returns of this co-operative are 
distributed throughout its member patrons in proportion to patronage as well as 
shareholding. Member patrons and investors are receiving returns in the form of dividend 
payments in proportion based on patronage and investment or through appreciable share 
value (Evans & Meade, 2005). 
 
Without additional funds, better prices, and other economic stimulus, the agricultural 
industry will lose its competitiveness in the market. Therefore, co-operatives have 
changed in recent decades. In recent years, traditional co-operatives are attempting 




operative that focuses on markets and specializes in certain products in order to improve 
operational efficiency as well as to improve the quality of the products. The establishment 
of NGC could also address the need for market information and coordination, the need to 
restructure the market and the need to boost rural income and employment. NGC is 
attractive to the producers because it provides the opportunity to increase their income by 
direct involvement  in business ventures that relate to the production output and obtaining 
better markets for their product (Nilsson, 1997). 
 
New co-operative organizational models differ in how ownership rights are assigned to 
the economic agents (members, patrons, and investors) tied contractually to the firm (F. 
R. Chaddad & Cook, 2004). The characteristics of an NGC is as follows 1) The entry fee 
for NGC members is substantial, 2) members share in the profits of the enterprise in 
accordance with the number of shares they purchased, 3) NGC have a typically closed 
membership. Only members who purchased a share in the venture can participate in NGC 
(Merret & Walzer, 2001). NGC have limited delivery rights and restricted membership, 
the members, often have to invest some initial amount of money to be the part of co-
operatives. Investors who provide financial capital are entitled to co-operative 
membership. These investors, who might not be the producers, help finance the operation 
of the business through the purchase of shares. This addresses the undercapitalization 
problem of traditional co-operatives. Even so, the NGC retain the important co-operative 
principles as in the traditional co-operatives. They implement the rule of one member one 
vote, but are more similar to investor-owned firms than their traditional counterparts 
(Carlberg, Ward, & Holcom, 2006). 
 
More recently, co-operatives have begun to transform into a new organizational model 
called the transnational co-operatives. These are  co-operatives with members in two or 
more countries. To be a transnational co-operative is not an easy decision because there 
are several barriers to be considered such as differences in history, culture, language and 
the local members who are hesitant to accept foreign members. The transnational co-
operative needs to maintain international members and governance which might lead to 
a higher cost (Bijman et al., 2014). 
 
Despite the transformation of different co-operative models, all of the co-operatives are 




the concept of co-operatives are the co-operative must provide the best possible benefit 
to the members. The external partners are also allowed to receive benefit but not decisive 
control, nor impede the members’ benefit (Nilsson, 1999). The values of co-operatives 
set the spirit of operation and business that distinguishes co-operatives from corporations.  
The values of loyalty, participation, shared knowledge, and strong commitment of its 
members to achieving the purpose of the co-operative has become the competitive 
advantage of a co-operative. However, to be able to generate these competitive 
advantages, it requires an alignment of common interest from all members of the co-
operative, who are both investors and consumers regarding the purpose of the co-
operative (Birchall & Ketilson, 2009). 
 
3.4.Agricultural Co-operatives 
The co-operative business model has been widely adopted in the agricultural sector. 
Agricultural Co-operatives are one of  several types of co-operative such as Consumer Co-
operatives, Workers’ Co-operatives, Credit Co-operatives, and Service Co-operatives 
(Prakash, 2003). The International Co-operative Alliance defines agricultural co-operatives as 
“all co-operatives that operate along the entire agricultural value chain, starting from the 
cultivation of agricultural products and livestock farming to the industrial processing of 
agricultural products and animals” (Bazzana et al., 2017).  
 
Two types of Agricultural co-operative can be distinguished. The first one is supply co-
operatives where the main activity is supplying input to farmers. The second one is marketing 
co-operatives that sell and distribute either fresh or processed agricultural products (Bijman 
et al., 2014). Agricultural Co-operatives bring several benefits according to Co-operatives UK 
(Self, 2017), which are: 
 Control. Agricultural co-operatives give farmers control over crucial parts of the 
supply chain 
 Cost savings. Through economies of scale farmers are able to cut costs by 
collaborating in vital business areas like purchasing, processing and marketing 
 Tax efficiency. Members of agricultural co-operatives can achieve tax efficiency 
through ‘mutual trading status’ 
 Best practice. Collaboration enables farmers to share knowledge and best practice 





The benefit of agricultural co-operatives varies between regions. O. F. Bekkum and van Dijk 
(1997) and Hansen (2009) discovered that there is evidence that dairy co-operatives in the EU 
and US have gained increasing market share. Zheng et al. (2012) stated that the establishment 
of agricultural co-operatives in China improves farmers' economic welfare and market 
competitiveness. It can make small-scale agricultural producers more competitive in the 
global market. It has been proven that the co-operatives successfully foster the local 
agricultural economy. Kurimoto (2004) in his study found that the agricultural co-operatives 
in Japan have become more powerful as a result of the evolution supported by the institutional 
framework. 
 
Agricultural co-operatives have played a major role in developing the economy (F. R. 
Chaddad & Cook, 2004), although co-operatives in every country have a different degree of 
importance (Hansen, 2009). Among the top 300 co-operatives around the world, agriculture 
and food  is the second largest sector after the insurance sector among (Bazzana et al., 2017). 
The turnover of the 20 top agricultural co-operatives in the world is US $ 273.02 billion in the 
year 2015 (Bazzana et al., 2017). Most of the co-operatives originated in developed countries 





Source: (Bazzana et al., 2017) 
 
In the US there were 2,047 agricultural cooperatives in 2015. The net income after taxes 
reached $7.030 billion (USDA, 2015). In the United Kingdom (UK),  agricultural co-
operatives are the second largest sector among the other co-operatives  with a turnover of 
£5.8 billion in 2016. The 416 agricultural co-operatives give employment to 7,765 people 
in the UK (Self, 2017). In Japan, agricultural co-operatives report outputs of US $90 
billion with 91% of all Japanese farmers in membership (ICAO, 2018). In Europe, 
agriculture is the largest cooperative sector by annual turnover with more than 39% (347 
€ billion) of the total annual cooperative turnover in Europe. There are more than 50,000 
cooperative enterprises in Europe which employed 675,566 people (Cocolina, 2015). 
Table 13 shows the top Agriculture Co-operatives in Europe in 2013. 
Table 14 The Largest Co-operatives in the Agriculture and Food Industries Sector 





Table 15. Top Agriculture Co-operatives in Europe by turnover (billion €) in 2013 
 
Source: (Cocolina, 2015) 
 
Beside bringing financial advantages, agricultural co-operatives in developed country 
also make other contributions to society. A recent study in New Zealand  found that the 
non-financial indicators are related to three sustainable development dimensions: people, 
profit and planet (Garnevska et al., 2018). 
 
3.5. Internationalization of Agricultural Co-operatives 
3.5.1. The Internationalization Strategy  
Agricultural co-operatives have been implementing different strategies of 
internationalization. Errasti, Heras, Bakaikoa, and Elgoibar (2003) believe that the key 
criteria for adopting an internationalization strategy are it has to be coherent with the 
principles and values of the co-operatives at the same time as optimizing the 
opportunities. According to Guillouzo and Ruffio (2005), there are two elements of the 
internationalization of co-operatives: internationalization of the commercial activities and 
the internationalization of membership.  
 
The internationalization of commercial activities has developed fast among the co-
operatives, while the internationalization of membership is developing slowly. The 
internationalization of membership known as transnational co-operative usually happens 
by recruiting foreign farmers as the co-operative member. The foreign members usually 




market similarity (Bijman et al., 2014). Some differences in legislation on co-operatives 
among countries has become one of the reasons that transnational co-operatives have not 
been a popular strategy (Guillouzo & Ruffio, 2005). 
 
Co-operatives in the agricultural sector can consider four basic competitive strategies to 
internationalize according to Cook (2000) as cited in Ritossa and Bulgacov (2009), which 
are imports, exports, direct foreign investment and commercial relationships. Theuvsen 
and Ebneth (2005) and Guillouzo and Ruffio (2005) also discuss that internationalization 
of agricultural co-operatives are mostly in the form of exporting, joint ventures and 
foreign direct investment. Moreover, Donoso (2003) introduced an internationalization 
model used by agricultural co-operatives which is called the Foreign Market Service 
Modes (FMSM) as seen in Figure 7. This model outlines six strategies of the common 
internationalization process of a co-operative: exports (direct and indirect), direct foreign 
investment (joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiary), sourcing overseas, knowledge 
agreements (licensing, research and development), strategic alliances and transnational 
cooperatives.  
 
Figure 7 Foreign Market Service Modes (FMSM) used by international agricultural  
co-operatives 
source: (Donoso, 2003) 
 
Guillouzo and Ruffio (2005) identify several internationalization strategies employed by 
the European dairy co-operatives that begins with raw material procurement from foreign 
countries, export to foreign markets, franchise agreements, to developing the 
multinationalization approach. The first strategy aims to ensure raw material procurement 




is a basic strategy for co-operatives to grow their market outside the domestic market. 
Franchise agreements aim to take advantage of the knowledge and assets of commercial 
activity brought to foreign countries. In the multinationalization approach, co-operatives 
control the industrial and commercial subsidiaries in over five continents around the 
world. They operate similarly to the multinational companies by processing high-added-
value products. The development of business is based on research development and 
innovations. 
 
While exporting is one of the oldest forms of internationalization, the most common 
approach of internationalization chosen by the co-operatives are strategic alliances and 
foreign direct investment. Evans and Meade (2006) Juliá-Igual et al. (2012) also found 
that co-operatives promoted internationalization via strategic acquisitions in other 
countries where they have their main target markets. A study by Guillouzo, Perrot, and 
Ruffio (2005) also found that strategic alliances are one of the internationalization forms 
that is suitable to develop agri-food co-operatives in the EU by adapting to market reality 
and competitions. Through surveys of major Danish cooperatives, Hansen (2009) shows 
that foreign direct investments are a common tool chosen as the internationalization 
strategy. A study by Theuvsen and Ebneth (2005) also showed that agricultural co-
operatives in Germany increased their competitiveness by joining forces through mergers 
and acquisitions. Meanwhile, Errasti et al. (2003) state that foreign direct investment in 
the form of joint ventures, greenfield investment and acquisitions are the chosen form of 
agricultural co-operatives’ internationalization strategy.  
 
3.5.2. The Motive of Internationalization 
The rapid market changes, trade liberalization and increasing competition in the agri-food 
industry requires agricultural co-operatives to be adaptive to the competition by 
implementing internationalization strategies (Evans & Meade, 2006). In general, the 
motives of co-operatives to internationalize are similar to the other forms of business. 
One of the main drivers of internationalization is to develop market access because of the 
stagnated domestic market (Ritossa & Bulgacov, 2009). According to Theuvsen and 
Ebneth (2005), internationalization happens because the co-operatives want to access new 
markets. Many of the co-operatives internationalize because of the need to widen the 
market to increase the volume of operation and improve market share (Juliá-Igual et al., 




to strengthen their market power, to secure market shares, and to find new market 
opportunity if the local market has reached a maturity stage. Moreover, Evans and Meade 
(2006) also said that the internationalization of the co-operatives is to adapt to changing 
consumer preferences. 
 
 Guillouzo and Ruffio (2005) argue that financial aspects drive internationalization. The 
cooperatives are trying to improve access to capital and to reduce the cost of labor, 
equipment, or raw materials.  Donoso et al. (2003) also argue that the internationalization 
of co-operatives is often motivated by the need to reach economies of scale. Bijman et al. 
(2014) support this, suggesting that internationalization has been a means to achieve 
economies of scale that enables them  to be able to negotiate with large retail customers. 
They also point out that the differences of motive between co-operatives and investor-
owned firms is that co-operatives are more focused on seeking efficiency and risk 
aversion as their main motive. For example, the European sugar co-operatives that are 
gaining economies of scale by acquiring foreign sugar factories to integrate them into 
larger production units. Hansen (2009) argue that besides that, the internationalization of 
co-operative still has to answer the main objective which is to generate the highest profit 
to benefit the owners.  
 
Guillouzo and Ruffio (2005) believe that internationalization is one way to diversify risk 
by distributing activities. This is similar to the view of Thompson et al. (2010) who 
suggest that  internationalization is executed as a way to manage risk by portfolio 
diversification.  In contrast, Ritossa and Bulgacov (2009) discovered that larger co-
operatives in Brazil are less motivated to the reduction of risks. Obtaining better trade 
prices through diversification is more relevant to cooperatives with more frequent 
international transactions. Internationalization is also carried out by the co-operatives to 
obtain global efficiency, acceleration of innovation and learning, to follow global trends 
and build global reputation (Thompson et al., 2010). 
 
3.5.3. The Advantage of Internationalization 
Internationalization has brought some positive advantages for the agricultural co-
operatives. According to Ritossa and Bulgacov (2009), internationalization has led to 
increased productivity and performance which has improved the competitiveness of co-




operative show less resistance if their interests are being met. Seipel and Heffernan (1997) 
as cited in Ritossa and Bulgacov (2009) identify a special element of co-operative 
organizational form which brings advantage to the internationalization process, which is 
that potential business partners see co-operatives as being  ethical and trustworthy. Since 
co-operatives are considered more trustworthy, it could avoid the problem of asymmetric 
information where producers engage in opportunistic behavior that exploits the 
consumers. Co-operatives are also considered more effective in responding to market 
failures and social problems (Spear, 2000).  
 
Bretos and Marcuello (2017) argue that a cooperative has an advantage over other types 
of firms in that it has the power to make social and economic change in the globalization. 
Since co-operatives are based on  strong community relations , they have the advantage 
to raise social capital to improve economic performances (Spear, 2000). Hansen (2009) 
points out the economic advantages of international acquisition which include gaining 
better synergy, economic of scale, access to new customers and suppliers that drive 
growth for the co-operatives.  
 
The financial advantages of internationalization are still debated among academics. 
However, according to Geringer, Beamish, and Costa (1989, as cited in Ritossa, 2009) 
the impact is not always positive because internationalization leads to a higher cost of 
managing geographic distances which may reduce profits at a certain level of 
internationalization. Juliá-Igual et al. (2012) also agree that empirical studies show that 
mergers and acquisition among co-operatives are not always followed by the expected 
result of improved financial and economic indicators. 
 
3.5.4. The Risk and Challenges of Internationalization  
In the internationalization process, a co-operative goes through several stages, each of 
them has its own challenges that must be addressed with a suitable strategy by the co-
operative in order to survive the competition (Hansen, 2009). Schroder et al. (1993) have 
identified six internationalization barriers faced by the agricultural co-operatives: 
 The producer control - where co-operatives should develop a marketing-oriented 
business that starts with customers instead of production orientation that start with 
the raw material supplied by their members because it will limit the effectiveness 




 The location in the food chain - since co-operatives are at the beginning of the 
food chain, they are often disadvantaged by other businesses that are closer to the 
market signals of customers 
 The dilemma of sourcing raw materials from the co-operative’s members or from 
foreign sources 
 The relationships with governments or whether there is  any government support 
 The strategic design and implementation 
 The development of a long-term financing strategic initiatives 
 
There are different barriers to internationalization according to the size and experience of 
the business. Large and experienced businesses are more concerned with managerial 
capabilities, organizational systems, and market access. While smaller and less-
experienced business have the financial aspect as the most significant concern (Scott-
Kennel, 2013). According to Hansen (2009), access to capital is one of the main 
internationalization challenges for the co-operative. Internationalization strategies such 
as foreign direct investment and acquisition are capital intensive while co-operatives have 
limited access to capital, unlike the investor-owned companies which can raise capital on 
the stock market. Evans and Meade (2006) also agree that the ability to raise capital is 
one of the constraints for the development of the cooperative.  
 
However, O’Connor & Thompson (2001) as cited in Donoso et al. (2003) argue that 
financial limitations are not a specific internationalization barrier, but  could be 
considered as a weakness of traditional co-operatives. This is supported by the view of F. 
Chaddad and Heckelei (2003) who also agree that generating capital is a general weakness 
of a co-operative. In contrast with these views, Rudzki and Davidson (2002) mentioned 
that a study by Ernst & Young found that the development of co-operatives is not 
constrained by the access to capital. Rather, constraints on development reflected the 
quality of management and strategic direction of the co-operatives. 
 
Ritossa and Bulgacov (2009) studied the internationalization of co-operatives in Brazil 
and found that the internationalization is challenged more by external factors such as: 
 currency exchange policy 




  poor logistics 
  Fiscal structures.  
The internal factors concerning the adaptation of managerial quality and structure are less 
important challenges to the co-operatives. Hansen (2009) also identified several 
challenges in the internationalization of a cooperative which include financial aspects, 
management, decision making, and membership structure of the cooperative. The other 
challenge is that the members of the co-operative are often more keen to immediately 
gain from the surplus of internationalization rather than investing for the development of 
the co-operatives. It is difficult to convince the members to reinvest their surplus in the 
co-operatives because the incentive to invest the surplus is considered smaller and usually 
in a longer time horizon (Hansen, 2009). 
 
3.6. Theoretical Framework 
Based on the literature review, we could understand that the global market is transforming 
rapidly as a result of globalization influenced by advanced information, communication, and 
technological (ICT) development. Companies in the food & agricultural sector cannot avoid 
the global competition, including Agri-food cooperatives in New Zealand. 
Internationalization and exporting of agricultural products could be said as the backbone of 
New Zealand economy. The agricultural co-operatives contribute an important role to the 
economy and society of New Zealand. However, not many studies have been conducted about 
internationalization of New Zealand Co-operatives.  
 
The recent internationalization theory shows the emergence of International New Ventures 
(INV) that are influenced by the development of ICT, which will be further referred as born-
globals in this study. Most agricultural co-operatives in New Zealand are considered as born-
globals because the challenge of a small domestic market made internationalization their main 
strategy of business growth. The emergence of born-globals brought some interest to study 
their preference for entry-modes in the internationalization process. Few studies have 
analyzed the determinants of entry-mode choice in the context of born-globals (Ripollés & 
Blesa, 2017). Based on the review of internationalization strategy by Zhao, Ma, and Yang 
(2017), they suggest future research to study the process of entry decision-making to provide 
more accurate evidence of internationalization influencing factors.  In this study, the focus 




internationalization process is limited to outbound activities involving foreign trade of 
agricultural products or other forms of foreign investment. 
 
Several studies on New Zealand co-operatives could be found in the (Nilsson & Ohlsson, 
2007; Gray & Heron, 2010; Garnevska et al., 2017; Garnevska et al., 2018). However, not 
many of them analyze the internationalization strategies. Scott-Kennel (2013) has studied the 
drivers of internationalization model of New Zealand firms. Nevertheless, her study only 
involved New Zealand firms in general, rather than co-operatives specifically. A 
comprehensive study on New Zealand Agricultural co-operatives has been performed by 
Donoso (2003). He succesfully identify the forms of internationalization strategies of the 
agricultural co-operative, however he has not identify the influencing factors of each strategy.  
 
Based on that literature gap, this research reviewed the internationalization process of New 
Zealand agricultural co-operatives and the factors that influenced the internationalization 
strategy. The influencing factors were outlined based on the latest studies of entry modes 
determinants (Shen et al., 2017; Scott-Kennel, 2013). The external factors were analyzed 
using Porter’s Five forces to understand the competitive position that influence the 
internationalization strategy. Additionally, the risk and challenges were also analyzed to 
understand how it influence the decision of internationalization strategy. This research will 
provide additional insights to the previously mentioned research gaps especially in the 
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4.1. Research Strategy 
Several conditions should be considered when determining which research strategy is going 
to be used in a study. According to Yin (2009), the three conditions are types of research 
questions, the extent of control over behavioral events, and the degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events. The five research methods commonly used are 
experiment, survey, archival analysis, history, and case study. Table 16 displays the relevant 
situations for different research methods. 
 
Table 16 Relevant Situations for Different Research Methods 








Experiment How, why? Yes Yes 
Survey Who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much? 
No Yes 
Archival Analysis Who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much? 
No Yes/no 
History How, why? No No 
Case Study How, why? No Yes 
Source: (Yin, 2009, p. 8) 
 
The type of research question in this study is explanatory, therefore the use of case study or 
history is preferred.  The study covers  contextual conditions on a contemporary event that are 
relevant to the phenomenon considered, thus a case study is relevant (Yin, 2009). The case 
study method provides detailed explanations and descriptions. Owing to the explanatory 
nature of the research questions, this study employs a qualitative research using a multiple-
case study. According to Yin (2009), a multiple case study has the advantage of robustness 
and strengthens the external validity of findings compared to a single case-study. 
 
4.2. Sampling 
4.2.1. Selection of case study 
The case study yields information-rich cases which can answer the research questions 
(Bailey, 2018). Two agricultural co-operatives in New Zealand were selected for this 




co-operatives were chosen from two of the largest agricultural sectors in New 
Zealand who performed successful internationalization strategies. The co-operatives 
are Tatua Co-operative representing the dairy industry, and the Alliance Group 
representing the meat industry. Each co-operative is a different size, has differing 
characteristics, and internationalization strategies. 
  
4.2.2. Selection of participants 
A purposive sampling technique was used to determine the participants involved in 
this study to collect the primary data. The purposive sampling was used in order to 
produce the most relevant information and data (Yin, 2011). Participants were 
selected based on their expertise and experience in the co-operative. Moreover, their 
knowledge and involvement in the internationalization process of the co-operative 
was also considered, therefore, the respondents chosen were senior leadership and 
management. A total of four respondents from ? participated in the semi-structured 
interview including the two chairmen, the CEO, and a senior manager. The reason 
for the number of samples is based on the consideration of time to complete the study 
and available relevant resources to be accessed  (Ruane, 2005) 
 
4.3. Data collection technique 
4.3.1. Primary Data 
The data collection techniques used in a study depend on the nature of the source 
(Thomas & Hodges, 2010). Various types and sources of primary and secondary data 
are needed to ensure the accuracy and validity of information collected (Yin, 2009). 
Most social research tends to focus on people as the primary data source (Thomas & 
Hodges, 2010).  
 
The interview is considered an insightful source of evidence that provides perceived 
causal inferences and explanations. The interview provide focus on the case study 
topics (Yin, 2009). Therefore, a semi-structured interview technique was conducted 
to collect the primary data in this research. It provides intensive discussion with more 
flexibility while maintaining the parameters of the topic of research (Gagnon, 2010). 
The interviewer used a list of structured questions prepared according to the topic, 
although the questions were not necessarily asked in a specified order (Bailey, 2018). 




issues of interest with additional questions asked according to the flow of the 
interview.  
 
The preferred method was a face-to-face interview and telephone interview which 
was tape-recorded for further analysis (Wilson & Sapsford, 2006). The face-to-face 
interview is able to provide body language, facial expression and other physical 
features which are useful to establish rapport. The face-to-face interview is a 
synchronous interview that allows both interviewer and the participants to be 
attentive for a certain amount of time so it will produce better quality answers 
(Bailey, 2018). Because of the time and distance limitation, a phone interview was 
also used in this research.  
 
4.3.2. Secondary Data 
Documentary information as the secondary data source is likely to be relevant to 
every case study topic. The documentation and archival records are employed in this 
study (Yin, 2009). The sources of this data are from the available data set that has 
been recorded in the form of company reports, records, academic journals or other 
documents (Philliber, Schwab, & Sloss, 1980). 
 
4.4.  Data analysis technique 
Data analysis is the process of analyzing the meaning of data from which the final results 
are written (Bailey, 2018). The analysis allows the researcher to see patterns, identify 
themes, discover relationship, develop explanations, or make interpretations (Hatch, 
2002) as cited in (Bailey, 2018).  The data in this study were analysed using qualitative 
data analysis.  
 
The analysis process began with the transcription of the recorded interviews which 
involved coding of important information. Coding is the process of identifying raw data 
by assigning descriptive labels based on relevant characteristics to be useful for 
generating analytic insights (Bailey, 2018).  
After coding, the next step was classifying the codes and grouping together into 
categories. Categories can include topics, events, processes, concepts, and descriptions of 
people and places. The next step was to determine the relationship of each separate 




the categories until the ideas and concepts can be analyzed to generate results (Bailey, 
2018). To analyze the competitive industry of the co-operatives, the Porter’s Five Forces 



















Figure 9 Porter’s Five Forces Model, source: Porter (1979) 
 
This model is a suitable tool to analyze the external factors of industries that shape the 
strategy of each co-operative studied (Porter, 1979). The external factors analyzed are the 
bargaining power of suppliers, bargaining power of customers, threat of new entrants, 
threat of substitute products and competition in the industry which are addressed as the 
competitive position in this study (Figure 9).  
  
After the analysis of each case study, a cross-case analysis was implemented. Based on 
the comparison, similarities or differences in the internationalization stage, strategies and 
the influencing factors of internationalization for each co-operative were analysed. The 
findings were then linked back and compared to the earlier literature (Yin, 1994). 




Ethical considerations were implemented to assess the study with respect to potential 
harm to the participants. In this regard, the Massey University Human Ethics Committee 
(MUHEC) conducted an ethical assessment and this study was judged to be low risk.  
 
In relation to the potential ethical implications for the participants, there are major ethical 
principles to be considered by the researcher before conducting the study ("MUHEC," 
2015). The major ethical principles are: 1) respect for people 2) minimisation of harm to 
participants, researchers, institutions and groups 3) informed and voluntary consent 4) 
respect for privacy and confidentiality 5) the avoidance of unnecessary deception 6) 
avoidance of conflict of interest 7) social and cultural sensitivity to the age, gender, 
culture, religion, social class of the participants, and 8) justice.  
 
Given these ethical principles to be considered, some actions to minimise the ethical 
implications were conducted. Prior to the study,, the potential participants were informed 
about the aim and details of the research. This also provides an opportunity for the 
participants to consider whether or not to participate. The researcher ensures that the 
identity of the participants will not be revealed. In relation to this, the researcher also 














CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS 
 




5.1.1. Company overview  
Tatua Co-operative Dairy Company is a leading global supplier of specialised dairy 
products. It is New Zealand’s oldest independent dairy company and was founded in 
1914. Tatua has a closed membership owned by 110 shareholders. Tatua’s headquarters 
and manufacturing plants are located in Morrinsville, New Zealand. Today, The company 
employs more than 370 staff and exports more than 95% of its products to around 65 
countries over the world. Besides that, it has also established subsidiaries in Japan, United 
States (US) and China. 
 
Table 17 Tatua’s Overview 
Source: (Tatua, 2017) 
 
Tatua’s supply of milk solids in 2017 experienced a 3.9% reduction to 15 million 
kilograms because of the cold and wet spring that influenced the grass-fed milk supply. 
However, the quality of milk remained at a very high level. The growth in speciality 
business, alongside the increase of milkfat prices, has generated a 13% increase of total 
revenue to $328 million from 2016 to 2017. This resulted in a 14% increase in earnings 
before payout, taxation and retentions to $114 million in 2017. Tatua had a group asset 
of $ 250 million in 2016/2017 and declared a payout to its shareholders of $7.10 per 
kilogram of milk solids . 
 
Tatua collected 166 million litres milk from its supplier in 2017.  The raw milk is 
manufactured into a range of value-added dairy products as Tatua’s core business and 
focus of investment. It  processed the collected milk into flavour ingredients, speciality 
nutritional and bio-nutrients, as well as food service and consumer products. The products 




































supplements, texturiser, appetite control, sport and enteral nutrition, shelf life extender, 
meal replacements and functional food supplements.  
 
The products of Tatua have been highly specialised and differentiated, perceived as 
unique, thus targeting a limited market segment who are willing to buy at a premium 
price. The utilisation of the speciality dryer, commissioned in May 2015, remains a key 
focus for the business. Besides the specialized value-added products, Tatua also produce 
bulk ingredients of caseinate, whey protein concentrate and anhydrous milkfat. This 
business unit also served the business well in the global market where anhydrous milkfat 
prices doubled throughout the course of the year. However, the more specialised products 
increasingly contributed to the overall business and the annual result, and remained as the 
key business.  
 
5.1.2. History 
The Tatua Co-operative was initiated by William Milliken, an Irish man who came to 
New Zealand in the mid-1880s. After spending time in grocery trading, he saw the 
potential value of dairy farm investment in the land of Tatua. He helped to develop other 
productive farms and began to form a community of dairy farmers. The rising challenge 
was getting the milk to the factories for processing. In 1913, the competition of dairy 
factories was very tightly surrounded by vibrant dairy companies. If Milliken and the 
others did not act soon, Tatua would shortly be swallowed up by existing dairy 
companies. In early June 1914, the group then decided to build their own cheese factory. 
 
They committed to registering the new company with a capital of £5,000 in £1 shares. 
The group elected their first set of company directors: William Gyde, Robert Ramsey, 
Johan Henriksson, William Whinwray, William Woodley, George Runciman and 
William Milliken as the Chairman. They signed the Memorandum of Association for The 
Tatua Co-operative Dairy Company Limited on 16 June 1914. The Bank of Australasia 
granted a £1,900 overdraft facility to fund the establishment of the new factory. Three 
months later, the cheese factory began its operation . On 24 September, the first ten 
suppliers delivered their milk to the factory.  
 
In 1914, the size of the herd, worldwide, declined and the prices for dairy produce reached 




New Zealand to receive high value from the worldwide shipment of the dairy products, 
and, because of that, Tatua tripled their factory size in only one year. Tatua made rapid 
progress during the year, achieving a strong balance sheet and payment for the 
shareholders.  
 
Over time, Tatua continued to grow the business by adding casein, dried skim milk 
powder, aerosol cream, butter, lactoferrin, bionutrients, and other value-added dairy 
products to their products’ portfolio. In 2001, a mega-merger of dairy industry occurred 
after the deregulation of New Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB) followed by the creation of 
Fonterra. However, Tatua decided to remain independent. The timeline of Tatua’s 
business growth can be seen in Table 18. 
 
Table 18. Tatua’s Timeline 
Year Milestone 
1914 Establishment of Tatua Co-operative Dairy Company Limited 
1915-
1920 
- Factory extension triples factory size  
- All cheese output for export to UK 




- Tatua prize-winning cheeses bring top export prices  
- Biggest cheese output in NZ (939 tons) 
- Morrinsville Dairy Company begins taking Tatua cream 
- Great Depression: price of New Zealand cheese falls 30% in 1930  
- single-desk purchase of agricultural products and guaranteed minimum 
price scheme 
1939-45 World War II: Tatua is essential supplier as largest cheese factory in NZ 
1946-
1950 
- Tatua concludes cheese production, commences casein manufacture 
- roller-dried skim milk powder production 
1952-
1965 
- Tatua begins mixed production of casein and dried skim milk powder 
- Tatua produces first 26% whole milk powder  
- Tatua opens new edible casein plant  
- Installation of Coulter dryer and production of spray-dried powder. 
1966-
1981 
- Producing sodium caseinate and spray-dried casein 
- Tatua dries its first whey protein 
- Dairy Whip aerosol launched in Australia, New Zealand and UK 
1982-
1990 
- Tatua introduces its second brand, Farmer’s Pride, into Australia and NZ  
- Tatua developed a range of caseinates for export customers 
- Launch of Tatua Foods Division  
- Operation of butter, whey protein, lactoferrin plants 
1991-
1996 
- Niro Dryer commissioned 
- Tatua opens whey protein concentrate plant 
2001 - Deregulation of the Dairy Board. Tatua remains independent 




2003 The company launched its flavour ingredients and bionutrients business 
2004 Launch of Tatua Japan Subsidiary 
2005 Tatua began the operations of its anhydrous milk fat plant 
2011-
2012 
Opening of new foods plant, packing line and hydrolysis plant 
2014 Launch of Tatua Shanghai and USA Subsidiary 
2015 Establishment of the new specialised powders’ dryer 
 
5.1.3. Strategy Evolution of Governance 
Throughout the period of its establishment, Tatua has experienced a change of chairman 
12 times. Tatua was first established as a cheese processor back in the early years under 
the leadership of its first chairman, W.H. Milliken. The cheese was exported by New 
Zealand Government with a sole-purchase policy in the event of war. 
 
In 1919, Zealandia Milkfoods Ltd was established as a fully owned subsidiary owned by 
New Zealand Co-operative Dairy Company. Zealandia, with its massive dried milk 
powder factory, was on the hunt for additional supply. They asked several co-operatives, 
including Tatua, to join them to have their own dried milk powder factory. Tatua, under 
the governance of William Darral, agreed to join Zealandia Milkfoods Ltd because the 
market and returns from dried milk powder was very attractive. However, it turned out 
that the construction of the new milk powder plant faced several obstacles. With no viable 
factory, Tatua were released from their decision to amalgamate. Tatua decided to leave 
the  Zealandia scheme in the next year.  
 
The Dairy-produce Export Control Act became law in 1923. The Act gave the new Dairy-
Produce Control Board authority over the purchase, export, sale, and distribution of New 
Zealand Dairy produce. The regulation failed and the whole system was terminated in 
1927. Tatua decided they could sell better by themselves and negotiate their own 
contracts. Tatua had a record season, producing 939 tons of cheese and enabled the 
company to pay a bonus to suppliers. 
 
Tatua’s current focus strategy on value-added products began in 1970s under the 
leadership of C.K.Sing. This strategy was considered by Tatua because, during the 1970s, 
The New Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB) introduced a cost model basis of payment based 




larger dairy producers if it were to be paid on the NZDB cost model. Therefore, Tatua 
developed a high-value low-volume strategy. 
 
In 2000, Tatua decided to adopt the modern co-operative idea under the governance of 
Alan Frampton, to move a bit closer to the investor-owned co-operative by introducing 
Milksolids Supply Entitlement (MSE) in addition to nominal shares. In this way, Tatua 
was trying to put a market-related value on share capital and also create control of the 
growth of milk supply. Voting is based on one vote per kilogram of miksolids and 
shareholders cannot have more than 5% of the votes. 
 
Under the regulation of NZDB, all of the dairy products exports from New Zealand were 
managed by them as the sole-exporter. The dairy co-operatives were responsible for the 
marketing and distribution in the domestic market, while all of the international 
transactions from shipping, quality control, market promotion and other services were 
under the NZDB. The NZDB was deregulated, followed by a mega-merge between the 
two largest dairy cooperatives, The New Zealand Dairy Group (NZDG) and Kiwi that 
merged in 2001 to form Fonterra. Tatua were asked several times to take part in the 
merger, but Alan Frampton as Tatua’s Chairman at that time, decided that Tatua would 
not join because no-one was able to demonstrate that the shareholders would be better off 
in a merger situation. Tatua and Westland decided not to join the merger and remained 
an independent co-operative.   
 
Since the NZDB was responsible for all exports of dairy products beforehand, the 
deregulation of NZDB was a critical landmark for the dairy cooperatives’ 
internationalization strategy. In this phase, Tatua prepared a transformation of strategy 
since they gained direct access to the international market where they became responsible 
for all of the marketing and transportation of their products. 
 
 “We’ve been through quite a transformation during the period from being a dairy 
processing company who by legislation had to sell through a single seller NZDB and in 
2001 where we prepared ourselves strategically for the event of the deregulation to 
become a fully integrated international company ourselves. It all occurred in 2001-2003 
when we were still in transition where Fonterra was actually our agent for the majority 





After the transition,  Tatua evolved and wanted to further grow their business by not only 
exporting through distributors.  
 
“At first we started with agencies and distributors then we evolved. We traveled, we 
talked to other people, travelled regularly to establish relationships. Once established 
and business flows, then the business can justify. For many years we had agencies with 
NZDB and Fonterra, over the time we are taking more and more to a subsidiaries type of 
arrangement” (Chairman of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Tatua decided to establish their own subsidiaries in Japan as one of their biggest markets.  
 “In 2003, at that time I’d been Chairman for around one month, we decided to establish 
Tatua Japan which was really our first effort of having our own subsidiaries. And the 
other arrangements from 2001-2003 were primarily agency arrangements; some of them 
remain with Fonterra but we replaced what we had done with both NZDB and Fonterra 
with agencies in countries we were choosing to market”  
(Chairman of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Under the leadership of their current chairman, Tatua continued to add subsidiaries in 
China and USA in 2014 as a strategy to grow their business in their key markets. Tatua 
had not yet considered a joint venture as an option to expand their business because they 
chose to remain independent and avoid conflicts that might arise in joint ventures as stated 
by their current CEO. 
 
“It’s not something we plan on doing at the moment. JV can be one way to access the 
market but they can be challenging as well. We are pretty careful about doing the JV. We 
don't have the need now. What starts out being common can sometimes evolve differently 
through the course of the JV. So, people may have the same intention and understandings 
and even very similar common values, see the opportunity the same, behave the same, but 
as the individuals change within the organization and as the underlying business evolves, 
sometimes it can grow apart and be no longer compatible, that is the risk of joint 
ventures.” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 




Tatua aims to be the leading global supplier of specialised dairy products. A focus strategy 
has been implemented by Tatua by aiming at high-value and low-volume markets. The 
CEO stated that specialised and differentiated dairy products achieved a high sales price 
compared to the commodity price model.  Tatua focuses on returning more to its supplier 
by improving the value-added products rather than pursuing milk-volume growth 
strategy. 
 
Tatua has considered maximizing the potential of their existing plant and product mix for 
their volume and value growth, thus modest capital investment was implemented in 2018. 
However, they are looking forward to positive outlooks and opportunities. Tatua have 
continued to implement their strategic plan for 2013-2018 which includes four strategic 
themes (Tatua, 2017):  
1. Grow Tatua’s earnings premium over the New Zealand milk price 
The establishment of the new specialised powders dryer will enable Tatua to improve the 
quantity and range of specialised dairy powder flavours, bionutrients, and hydrolysates 
that are high in value and are expected to further expand the business. The commissioned 
subsidiaries in Japan, China and USA are also major initiatives to improve the earnings’ 
premium in Tatua’s key markets. 
 
2. Make the business more sustainable.  
In recent years, Tatua put more focus on sustainability of the business. Besides achieving 
economic success, Tatua also developed more initiatives for positive social and 
environmental outcomes. Tatua acknowledge the importance of sustainability, not only 
for the shareholders and customers, but also for the wider community and future 
generations. Tatua has partnered with schools and universities to arrange site visits to 
educate younger people about dairy farming and the manufacturing environment. Tatua 
has also created an emerging leaders’ programme to develop potential rural leaders. The 
recent environmental initiatives were an upgrade of waste water treatment infrastructure 
and development of a responsible farming programme for on-farm sustainability.  
“our real challenge actually is just growing the business in the right places in the right 
way and making sure that the growth that we have is sustainable growth and not just fast 
growth in the moment” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 




Tatua has a value of hard work and exceeding the customer’s expectations by adding 
value and delivering quality.  Pride of the people and company has made a strong team 
that is going the extra mile. The team is responding with agility, speed, as well as respect.  
 
4. Attract, develop and retain great people 
People are an important asset to Tatua that differentiate it from other companies. Tatua 
pays special attention to providing a safe, productive and sustainable workplace for their 
employees.  
 
5.1.5. Business structure  
Tatua’s business, itself, is broken into production of bulk ingredients and special added-














 Bulk ingredients: This business unit offers casein protein, whey protein 
concentrates (WPC), and anhydrous milk fats (AMF) 
 Tatua nutrition and bionutrients. The products in this unit are protein-based, and 
produced into speciality nutritional ingredients comprising whey and casein 
hydrolysates; lactoferrin, lactoperoxidase, coisolate, and glycomacropeptide; 
phospholipid concentrate and beta serum powder for dietary and specialized 
nutritional applications. In addition, they offer bionutrients consisting of dairy and 
soy peptones for diagnostic media, cell culture media, fermentation media, 
probiotics, and vaccines 
Tatua Products
Bulk Ingredients





Tatua Flavours Tatua Food
Retail
Food Service
Figure 10. Tatua Products 




 Tatua flavours. This business unit focuses on the ingredients including butter, 
cream, cheese, and custom-designed flavours for the food and beverage industry 
 Tatua food. These are cream-based consumer products comprising creams, 
chocolate dessert toppings, and cheese sauces. Tatua also provides foodservice 
products, including creams, sauce, dairy whipped creams, and liquid mixes. 
 
Tatua generates more from business to business transactions, as consumer trade is only a 
small part of their activities. 
 
“Most of our business is making ingredients for someone else; we don't have a very big 
consumer business. We are making things that someone else uses in their processes. We 
have a small consumer business that's a very small part of our business; we are mainly a 
specialist ingredients’ business. The Business to consumer is more local in NZ and 
Australia. Sometimes we sort of think that Australia  as being part of our domestic market, 
but they are also an export market of course” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Tatua is a closed membership co-operative with dairy farmers as their suppliers, as 
mentioned by their senior management. 
 
“We are a wholly farmer’-owned co-operative that is not partially owned by farmers and 
public, thus we don’t have external shareholders”.  
(Senior Manager of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Tatua believe that being an independent co-operative is the most suitable and secure form 
for their business as stated by their chairman:  
 
“We have chosen to remain independent. From the shareholder perspective we are very 
comfortable with having farmer shareholders, very comfortable with our three 
international subsidiaries; we have a good relationship with other dairy companies and 
other distributors” (Chairman of Tatua, 2018) 
  
Tatua implemented strict rules and requirements for new shareholders. The producer 




structure is based on a nominal share that is redeemable at their nominal value, but not 
tradable.  
 
Since 1999/2000, a “hybrid” share structure has been in place. In addition to nominal 
shares, there is the Milksolids Supply Entitlement (MSE), which gives the shareholder 
the right to supply a kilogram of milksolids. The idea of MSE was inspired by new 
generation co-operatives to capture the value Tatua adds to the milk (Nilsson & Ohlsson, 
2007).  
 
The MSE was issued to Foundation shareholders who were the suppliers in the 1999/2000 
season. The MSE was free of charge since these shareholders had already invested in 
Tatua through shares and retained earnings. The number of MSEs distributed was based 
on the plant capacity that was still lower than milk intake allowing an increase in 
production. The unused MSEs can be transferred between the shareholders (Nilsson & 
Ohlsson, 2007).  
 
In 2015, Tatua issued an additional 800,000 MSE to their shareholders and made a “one 
for one” bonus issue of shares to return some of the earlier retentions to shareholders. 
This initiative is made to give some growth option for Tatua’s supplier which is crucial 
to Tatua’s sustainability. Tatua has not yet issued any further MSEs in the following 
years. 
 
“The MSE can be leased, sold, or given away among shareholders. The suppliers need 
to have one nominal share and one MSE for every kilogram of milksolids supplied to 
receive full payout.” (Senior Manager of Tatua, 2018) 
 
This system guarantees the control over the milk volume supplied to the co-operative as 
opposed to a co-operative with a collective structure, where delivery is unrestricted and 
the co-operative has an intake obligation. The right to vote is proportional to the 
production rights; each kilogram of milksolids entitling the shareholder to one vote, with 
a limit of five percent of the votes being held by one supplier. 
 




Tatua maintains a strong balance sheet and financial performance in 2017. The financial 
indicators during 2013-2017 can be seen in Table 19. Tatua increased 13% of its revenue 
in 2017 to NZ$327.9 million from NZ$289.3 million in 2016. Tatua’s earnings, before 
payout, taxation, and retentions, also increased to $7.80 from $6.41 (EBITMP/kgMS). Its 
revenue per unit of milk is still the highest in the industry and it continues to generate the 
highest returns on its invested capital. 
 
Tatua’s superior performance is reflected in it consistently paying its farmers more for 
their milk than any other NZ processor. In 2017, the cash payout increased 12.7% from 
$6.30 /kgMS to $7.10 /kgMS. Tatua’s return on invested capital decreased to 9% in 2017, 
which is down from 15% in 2016 and 27% in 2015, but still above the industry average. 
 
Table 19. Tatua’s Financial Indicators 2013-2017 
Financial 
Indicators 












$7.80/kgMS $6.41 /kgMS $7.73 /kgMS $10.32 
/kgMS 
Cash Payout $7.10 /kgMS $6.30 /kgMS $7.10 /kgMS $9.00 /kgMS 
Retention (pre-
tax) 
50 cents/kgMS 11 cents /kgMS  63 cents 
/kgMS  
$1.32 /kgMS  
Gearing ratio 35% 35.7% 36.6% 25.2% 
Source: Tatua Annual Report 2013-2017 
 
As a co-operative, Tatua has a limited base of equity from its farmer-supplier shareholders 
and has used debt and retained earnings to fund capital expenditure. In 2015, the 
establishment of their third specialised powder dryer has increased the debt significantly,  
with a gearing ratio of 36.6.%. This was well below the 47% ratio predicted in the 
business case for the new dryer. Since that time, the gearing ratio has remained steady at 
around 35% of total assets. Its debt to assets ratio is relatively low given its underlying 
profitability compared with the other co-operatives in the dairy industry such as Fonterra, 
Westland, Synlait and OCD. 
 
“We fund everything we do with the equity of farmers and also debt. Being a relatively 





Tatua’s balance sheet has been strong because the business has always ploughed back 
money from retention. In 2017, Tatua achieved a strong increase of 50 cents/kgMS 
retention from 11 cents /kgMS in 2016. The retention is important for Tatua to ensure the 
financial strength necessary to invest in new plant, equipment and infrastructure to 
support the strategy of growing the Specialised Added Value business and making the 
business more sustainable. The shareholders also receive  powerful incentives to invest 
in the co-operative by tradable and appreciable shares. As stated by their senior manager, 
capital investment has not been a big challenge for Tatua. 
 
“Sometimes people think a co-operative can be a challenge because they can't raise 
capital to expand but that hasn't been a problem for us because we generated high enough 
returns that we can retain for our investment and still pay a premium price for the milk 
so farmers can further invest in their business” (Senior Manager of Tatua, 2018) 
 
5.1.7. Governance structure  
 Board of Directors 
Tatua is governed by a Board of Directors who is professionally committed to manage 
the business and meet the best interests of the shareholders. The Board of Directors is 
responsible for governing the firm since Tatua does not have a separate body such as a 
Shareholder Council. 
 
“We don’t actually have a shareholders’ council. We have a Board of Ddirectors of six 
elected and two appointed independent directors and we are responsible for the 
governing and delegating the management of the company. Our role includes the 
shareholders’ engagement so we don't have a separate body to look after shareholders, 
we do that ourselves” (Chairman of Tatua, 2018) 
 
 Management Team 
The Board of Drectors delegate the daily operation of the company to the CEO supported 
by a solid management team. This year, Tatua is still in leadership transition after the 
departure of the former Chief Executive Officer in December 2016. Tatua has appointed 






































Figure 11. Tatua's Organizational Structure 
 
Besides their head office and manufacturing plants in New Zealand, Tatua also has three 
subsidiaries as their sales and marketing representatives. Each of the subsidiaries is led 









5.1.8. Tatua’s competitive position in Dairy Industry 
5.1.8.1.Competition in the industry 
The dairy industry is a broad and promising sector, thus the global competition is 
considered high. The top 20 global dairy companies are dominated by companies 
from Europe, USA, and China, as seen in Table 20. The competitions that need to 
be considered by Tatua are both domestic and international. 
 
“Competition for us means two things; domestic competition of the milk supply 
and the global competitions to market our products. Our biggest competitors in 
the global market are mainly European, The United States as well as Chinese dairy 
companies” (Senior Management of Tatua, 2018) 
 
 
Figure 12 Tatua's Subsidiaries 





Source: (Rabobank, 2018) 
 
Fonterra is the biggest dairy company in New Zealand, and is also ranked as number 
six in the top 17 companies. Meanwhile, Tatua, with its revenue of NZ$289.3 million, 
is considered small compared to Fonterra with NZ$17.2 billion revenue in 2016 
(Fonterra, 2016; Tatua, 2016). Fonterra is the biggest local competitor for New 
Zealand, while other top local competitors are New Zealand Dairy Products Ltd, New 
Zealand Pure Dairy Limited, Synlait Milk Limited, and Westland Co-operative Dairy 
Co Ltd ([TDB], 2018). The CEO of Tatua stated that Tatua should have a better 
strategy to compete with Fonterra and the other large companies. 
 
“Fonterra is the benchmark in NZ. It’s a benchmark for large scale commodity 
producers; of course they have some value-added business, but they set the price 
base for the milk. We should always do better than them and that's because we got a 
much greater percentage of our business invested in the value added. We shouldn't 
be the same, we should be ahead. We want Fonterra to do well, we absolutely do, but 
we need to be better than Fonterra because we are not commodity producers” (CEO 
of Tatua, 2018)  
 





Tatua who sells bulk ingredients only in small volumes experienced competition 
from the bigger companies so they are selective in choosing the best returning 
markets. 
 
“Everything is competitive now. If we only look at the bulk ingredients, those 
products typically get a global commodity type return. Caseinate has the ? price in 
the world market and we get the same price, but because we are relatively small, we 
don’t have to participate in low returning markets just to move big volumes. We have 
a small volume of bulk ingredients to place in the world market; we can choose the 
best returning markets.” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
To face the competition, Tatua implemented a strategy by focusing more on the 
specialized value-added products. The specialized sector is competitive as well, but 
Tatua have positioned themselves as a niche market seller to receive a premium 
return. 
 
“On the value-added side, all are very competitive, but we are small enough to be 
genuinely flexible and genuinely collaborative. We can get interested in an 
opportunity that somebody else won't be interested in because that is just too small 
for them and they want something bigger. Something smaller still works for us 
because sometime small means a premium as well.  We set our business up so that 
we can play niches.” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
The focus strategy on the niche area has been working very well for Tatua in the 
international market as explained by their Chairman. 
 
“There’s always been competition, especially from European, NZ, and Australian 
companies. Yes, there's always been competition, but what we are trying to do 
is select and concentrate on the niche area that we think we can lead and be 
internationally competitive and we manage to do that in a number of areas.” 





Even though Tatua only accounts for a 1% market share in New Zealand,  it does 
create the most revenue per kgMS among the other dairy companies, which is 
$22.16/kgMS (Figure 13) [TDB] (2018). This can be achieved because Tatua is 












The adjusted Return on Asset (ROA) based on the regulated farmgate milk price 
(FGMP) in New Zealand could be one of the tools to assess the financial 
performances of the dairy companies in New Zealand. Tatua also shows a strong 
position with the highest ROA at 18% on average over the last three years (Figure 






Figure 13. Revenue per kgMS, 2017 






The senior management of Tatua stated that they not only study the global 
competitors, but also local competitors in the markets they are in. He also emphasized 
the importance of having a team of competent people in their subsidiaries so that they 
understand the competition thoroughly. 
 
“Yes absolutely, that is why we have people in the market. In China, for example, we 
understand who we are competing with, the customer, who the competition is, 
watch where they are going, import statistics and a lot of stuff. We can do that 
because we've got people in the market who understand what they are looking at. We 
can probably access plenty of good material in New Zealand, but if we don’t have 
people in the market, somehow we will be missing the context of it.” (Senior Manager 
of Tatua, 2018) 
 
In markets where Tatua do not have the subsidiaries, Tatua have assigned a special 
team who travel overseas to build connections with distributors and customers and 
understand the market competition they are in.  
 
Figure 14. Three Year average Adjusted Return on Asset 




“We have a very experienced team who travel a lot. They have got connections and 
they know those markets very well; they know who they are competing with and so 
on. We do have distributors that would be in partnership, or team up for a very long 
time. They become our eyes and ears in the market and of course they want to grow 
their businesses, so we want them to succeed so we can grow with them” (CEO of 
Tatua, 2018) 
 
According to the senior management, the key successes of Tatua to be able to 
compete in the global market,  is having the value-added business with the ability to 
create collaboratively specialized products  that are demand-led. 
 
“What enables us to be successful in the market is having the capability to genuinely 
develop value-added in the protein side and the cream side. Having the capability of 
being collaborative and still be agile enough so that we can look at smaller 
opportunities that are very profitable or have the potential to become big and not 
having the pressure of having to process more milk, we only bring as much milk into 
this business as we require. Fonterra, for example, has the obligation to process all 
milk that comes to it under regulation.” (Senior Management of Tatua, 2018) 
 
5.1.8.2.Power of suppliers 
Tatua only process 1% of the total milk supply in New Zealand, therefore, Tatua 
finds milk supply very competitive. They need to manage a strong strategy to sustain 
the loyalty of their suppliers. Tatua supply all of the main ingredients from a local 
supplier within a 12 kilometre range from their processing plants. They keep their 
membership closed to limited suppliers. This is related to their business strategy that 
does not pursue high volume, but high value.  
 
Tatua delivers high performance from their value-added strategy which enables them 
to give premium payouts for the milk supplied. Tatua also ensure the farmers retain 
enough investment to constantly grow their business.  
 
“We keep our membership closed because we don’t pursue high volumes. We want 




value. In this way we can give a high payout of milk and returns to the suppliers to 
keep them loyal in supplying their milk to Tatua” (Senior Manager of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Tatua has a very open and honest approach with the suppliers. A strong two-way 
communication enables the suppliers to feel in control of Tatua’s future. 
 
“We only have 110 supplier farms. We have a quite high level of connection with our 
shareholders because we are relatively small. We talk to them a lo;, they can talk to 
us anytime. They rely on us, we rely on them. We do update them, we are very open 
and honest and transparent, and we don't hide anything. We have communication 
sessions with them a few times a year.” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Tatua has been successful in maintaining the loyalty of their shareholders by creating 
strong trust, pride, and respect. Tatua has a closed membership with high entry-
barriers for potential members by strictly regulating the transaction by the possession 
of the Milksolids Supply Entitlements (MSE) as delivery rights. The combination of 
performance and loyalty is showing a great indicator of secure supply of future milk.  
 
5.1.8.3. Power of Customers 
Tatua runs their business based on opportunities in the global market and demands 
from the customers that suits their capability. 
 
“You have to start with what it is that the customers want. Do we have what the 
customers are looking for. If we don't, can we work closely with some strategic 
customers to develop the products that they require. It needs to be demand-led rather 
than just pushing our products to the market” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
Deep market knowledge is required to prepare their business plan in the international 
market and identify their potential customers. 
 
“It is about understanding individual markets, categories within markets, segments 
within those categories, who are the players, who we want to work with. What sort 
of products do we want to sell into because you can't do everything for everybody. 




chance for success, where we can make the most money.” (Senior Manager of Tatua, 
2018) 
 
In analysing an internationalization plan, Tatua makes sure that the products they are 
offering are meeting the interests of their customers.  
 
“We did some work in the US a few years back looking for opportunities. We just 
assumed that the products we have available from here would be well received; for 
the US we did some studies and sampling, spoke to some potential customers and 
they said we are not interested in these products. So, you’ve got to understand your 
market” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Tatua is willing to develop their products based on the specified need of the customer 
if it provides a long-term profitable opportunity for them. 
 
“With the specialized value-added products, it is much more about working very 
closely with potential customers to develop products that work for them. Tailoring 
products and offering to meet individual customer requirements and working closely 
with them”  
(CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Tatua has a team of technical and commercial people who work together with the 
customers to develop the products they need. 
 
“We have a team who are a good mix of people with deep technical knowledge and 
scientific understanding; very capable technically. We paired them up with people 
who are very good commercially. So, we ended up with the right outcome.” (Senior 
Manager of Tatua, 2018) 
 
The CEO also addresses the benefit of having a knowledgeable team in their 
subsidiaries to have good communication in understanding the customers.   
 
“It is important as well to have capabilities within the team, so we want to have a 




people in our business to understand what that really means and also who can 
communicate with the customers so that we can actually progress things. 
Communicate both in able to speak the language, but also to understand what's really 
being said. Technical people to technical people.” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
The collaborative relationship with customers is really important for Tatua especially 
for the specialized value-added business to understand the specific needs of 
customers and be able to deliver the products with high value in accordance with 
Tatua’s strategy to not only pursue the big volume markets. 
 
“Because the sort of business that we are in requires a very collaborative 
relationship and thorough understanding of the customer's business. So, we can team 
up with them and develop products with them. Partnership is huge for our business, 
especially in the value-added business. It’s not only having the connection in market, 
but also having people here in NZ who have those values and understand that we are 
not just a milk-pushed business. We have got to find our place in developing 
specialized products and help our customers with their requirements” (CEO of 
Tatua, 2018) 
 
5.1.8.4. Threat of substitute products  
The dairy products and derivatives are used by many manufacturers, especially in the 
food and beverage industry. In order to achieve a more economical production cost, 
many producers use substitutes for the dairy products such as vegetable oil, plant 
protein, and soy protein. The prices of dairy ingredient products are also highly 
volatile so producers prefer the substitute products with a more stable and cheaper 
price.  
The substitute products might be a threat for the dairy industry and hinder the market 
growth of the dairy bulk ingredients. However, the specialized value-added products 
of Tatua have become an alternative product demanded by the producers. 
 
“In some products the dairy fats are removed because it is expensive so vegetable fat 
might be included, but producers still want the products to taste and smell like dairy 





The use of substitutes product of the dairy ingredients has actually become an 
opportunity for Tatua to earn high value from innovating specialised and customized 
value-added products. 
 
“There are obviously dairy fat substitutes with oils and other dairy companies, either 
from NZ or internationally, that got substitute products, but what we tended to do at 
times, is evolve and continually develop and improve products that we compete in a 
high margins’ market,  rather than large volume” (Chairman of Tatua, 2018) 
 
5.1.8.5.Potential of new entrants into the industry 
The dairy value-added products have a prospective trend of growth in the global 
industry. Consumers have increased awareness about healthy and nutritional dairy 
products. Therefore, many producers are developing products such as dairy proteins, 
Greek yoghurt, drinking yoghurt and flavoured milk to address the rise in consumer 
demand. This category has been established in US and is still growing in Europe 
("The Next On Trend Dairy Innovations ", 2015). This growing trend has opened up 
new opportunities for manufacturers to produce healthy and nutritional value-added 
ingredients to make it available globally, however this specific area needs a lot of 
investment and expertise. 
 
"There is plenty of competition in such a broad industry internationally but, in some 
areas, we have not seen so much interest in the area we've been involved in because 
it's a very difficult area" (Chairman of Tatua, 2018) 
Tatua itself has differentiated its business by not pursuing high volume bulk 
ingredients market. Figure 15 shows that Tatua has put more investment in value-
added facilities than other dairy companies to generate higher sales per KgMS. This 
investment is reflected by Tatua’s highest earning of sales per KgMS compared to 
















Figure 15. Fixed Asset/KgMS, 2016 
source: ([TDB], 2018) 
 
It takes investment in long-term trusted customer relationships, and investment in 
manufacturing assets that cost a lot more than is required, for a commodity processor. 
The investment made by Tatua is both in manufacturing assets of value-added 
products, as well as long-term customer relationships. An additional NZD 8 billion 
of capital across the sector is needed by the other dairy processors if they want to 
apply the same investment per unit of milk as Tatua (Table 21). The high cost to enter 
this specific sector indicates the entry barrier for new entrants in New Zealand 
([TDB], 2018). 
 
 Table 21. Capital required for high-value dairy processing assets 
 









5.1.9. Analysis of Tatua’s competitive position 
The competitive position analysis, using the five forces tool, helps understand how Tatua 
shaped the internationalization strategy based on external competitive factors in the dairy 
















The competition of bulk ingredients in the dairy industry is high, however, Tatua has a 
very low percentage in trading bulk commodity products. To respond to the high 
competition in the bulk ingredients market, Tatua choose to focus more on value-added 
products and differentiate their products in the niche market. They are collaborating with 
global customers to deliver specific products based on their needs.  
 
The power of the supplier is high because Tatua faced tight competition with other larger 
dairy processors in New Zealand. However, Tatua does not consider the option to source 
milk outside of New Zealand because they are implementing restricted membership and 
want to keep the quality of their product. As a co-operative, they are securing the supply 
from their own shareholders by maintaining trust, pride, and the sense of ownership to 
Tatua. 
 
The power of costumers is also high because the customers are demanding more specific 
dairy products based on their needs. Therefore, it is important for Tatua to maintain a 
collaborative relationship to be competitive in the market and deliver specialized value-

















The threat of substitute products is quite low. Even though plant-based products are 
widely used as an alternative that is more economical than dairy products,  the 
manufacturer still wants the products to smell and taste like dairy. Therefore, it actually 
becomes an opportunity for Tatua to produce innovative customized value-added 
products based on Tatua’s expertise. 
 
The threat of new entrants is also low because the cost to join this industry is very high. 
Besides high investment, the value-added dairy processing industry also needs specific 
knowledge and expertise. Therefore, it creates an entry barrier for new entrants in this 
sector. 
 
Based on the external competitive factors in the dairy industry, Tatua has been consistent 
in implementing an appropriate focus strategy for their internationalization by aiming for 
high-value and low volume markets, and maximising the development of specialized 
added value products.  
 
5.1.10. Internationalization Strategy 
5.1.10.1.  Export 
Tatua could be considered as a born-global co-operative because the global market 
is their biggest source of income since the early years of the co-operative. The main 
reason for them to market their products outside New Zealand is the small size of the 
local market. Export is the preferred and main mode of internationalization for Tatua.  
“NZ is such a small market so we need to access the international market; that is 
how we do our business. We rely on export business. This won't be a business if we 
can't export. Export is everything to us” (CEO of Tatua, 2018). 
 
As a specialised value-added producer, Tatua has a need to find niche markets that 
are willing to pay premium prices for their specialized products. Tatua export 95% 
of its products to more than 65 countries globally. Some of Tatua’s biggest markets 
are China, Japan, USA, Korea, South East Asia, Latin America, and North America. 
 
“We’re more likely to concentrate on Southeast Asia, Japan, China, Indonesia, 
Korea, and so on that are sensible places for us to operate. We have a small business 




Tatua USA, Tatua Japan, and Tatua Shanghai,  are very much where we see the 
future growth of market” (Chairman of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Before the deregulation of NZDB in 1998, Tatua exported their products through 
NZDB as the single exporter of dairy products in New Zealand. Besides that, Tatua 
also had its own international exposure during that time by obtaining a license to sell 
from NZDB. 
 
“We did have some market experience because, despite the fact that NZDB was the 
sole seller of dairy products in NZ,  we could apply for a license to sell some dairy 
products on our account but that was quite a difficult thing to get one of those licenses 
because it was NZDB itself that issued the licenses. It was quite a justification process 
to be able to get a license and primarily you have to be making something and want 
to sell something that may be worth selling. So quite a difficult process to go through, 
but we did have some success on licensing some lactoferron and some other specialist 
products such as dairy whip so we can get international experience” (Chairman of 
Tatua, 2018) 
 
After the deregulation of NZDB and formation of Fonterra, Tatua was in a transition 
phase during 2001-2003 and continued to export their products through Fonterra’s 
distribution channel for a period of time while preparing to become a fully integrated 
international company. However, Tatua decided that they could not run their business 
on this exporting scheme forever. Some part of the capital that Tatua received after 
the dissolution of the NZDB, was used to develop an international exports’ network. 
Tatua believes that it is important to develop a strong international network and 
access for export. Therefore, they have assigned a resourceful commercial team who 
travel regularly to establish customer relationships in the export destination 
countries.  
 
“We have a very knowledgeable and capable commercial team who travel the world. 
They talk to each other. They pass it to somebody else, communicate, and give insight 
to other Business Units. We are small enough so we can work collaboratively 





In preparing their products for export, Tatua faced some challenges relating to the 
different legal requirements among countries as stated by their senior manager. 
 
"Some of the challenges with documentation and logistics are around getting 
products from New Zealand to some other countries where the legislation is quite 
complex. So, there are a lot of compliances of exporting from NZ to some of these 
countries that have been very challenging. But we work with various authorities both 
in NZ and the destination countries, to bring our products there smoothly." 
(Chairman of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Tatua will analyse the market opportunity and prepare a comprehensive market 
knowledge about the export destination countries. Tatua has a special team to prepare 
the legal requirements needed to enter the destined market. 
 
“To access the market, we have to understand the rules, regulations, and standards. 
We have a team in New Zealand who does that. They prepare the requirements that 
need to be fulfilled based on overseas market access requirements (OMAR) regulated 
by the Ministry for Primary Industry (MPI)” (Senior Manager of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Tatua choose to partner up with distributors to export the value-added products 
because they have more knowledge of the local market, and they also have an 
established supply chain and connection with local customers.  
“If we can go direct, we will, because it's less expensive. But we will also go with 
distributors because they have the connections, they have already established in 
market supply chain. So, we have these different partnerships around the world”  
(CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
The CEO of Tatua also stated that they are working hard at maintaining long-term 
relationships with their distributors in their export markets to mutually develop their 
businesses. This could be achieved by regularly visiting and in-person 
communication. 
 
“We have a very experienced team who travel a lot. They have got connections and 




on. For some other products we do have distributors that would be in partnership or 
team up for a very long time. They become our eyes and ears in the market. And, of 
course, they want to grow their businesses so we want them to succeed so we can 
grow with them”  
(CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Tatua exports its products directly for the bulk ingredients. Direct export is less 
expensive than through agents. However, most of Tatua’s exports of the specialized 
value-added products are through well-established distributors. Even though a low 
cost-model through direct export is tempting, it leads to low cost low margins which 
are not the focus strategy of their business.  
 
“For bulk ingredients we can export directly to Philippines, Malaysia or Indonesia, 
for example. These are the countries outside the subsidiaries because they don't cover 
those areas. For some product lines, we will have distributors in those markets 
because we will able to connect with all of the final customers. So, we have a mixed 
model.” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Exporting has become the main internationalization approach for Tatua, but they 
have also faced some challenges in exporting. One of the biggest challenges in 
exporting is the traceability of Tatua’s products when entering the foreign market, as 
stated by their CEO: 
“One of the challenges is when you don’t have your own people in the market you 
can loose traceability of your product because once you get through the distributor, 
they sell to others, an especially high fragmented type business model and market. if 
there's a problem with your product you won't be able to trace where the products 
are actually being used and loose visibility of that” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Another challenge is the business transactions impacted by the foreign exchange 
movement, but they already have a hedging programme to address this challenge. 
 
“Foreign exchange movement has quite an impact on our returns. We are very 
exposed to the US dollar because we are an exporter. We have a hedging program 





The senior manager of Tatua also adds that the perception of co-operatives, in some 
export markets, sometimes affect their credibility in doing business. However, with 
intensive communication they can build trust so the customers realize that Tatua is 
as reliable and professional as other multinational companies. 
 
“One of the challenges we face is the perception of co-operatives in some countries. 
Some customers in different countries perceived a co-operative as a small 
organization and they doubt that co-operatives are like the other big global 
companies”  
(Senior Manager of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Tatua has been successful in exporting to most of their prospective markets and still 
looking for growth opportunities based on the resources they have.  
 
“We are in most of the markets we want to be in; there's not like there are a whole 
lot of other markets out there that we've yet to discover or explore. It’s more about 
discovering opportunities for the capability that we have” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
This is in accordance with the statement of their senior manager about his role in the 
current position that Tatua is not focusing on finding new export markets but finding 
opportunities within the market to optimize their current capacity and resources. 
 
“I am responsible for progressing strategic projects and opportunities that are 
aligned with Tatua’s strategic direction. We become quite focussed on a few 
opportunities. We have opportunities by market, within market, and across different 
product groups as well. So, we make sure we have business plans for all of the four 
business units that cross geographies and identify key costumers we focus on” 
(Senior Manager of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Table 22 shows several types of exports implemented by Tatua as well as the type of 





Table 22 Tatua’s Type of Export 
Type of Export Type of Product Reason Challenge 
Export through 
NZDB 
All Products NZDB was the sole 
seller of dairy products 














Local distributors have 
more knowledge of the 
local market, 
established supply 
chain and connection 
with local customers 
Foreign Exchange 
Movement,  
Direct Export Bulk Ingredients Less expensive than 





5.1.10.2.  Subsidiaries 
Tatua has evolved their internationalization process by setting up subsidiaries. Tatua 
currently have three subsidiaries in Japan, Shanghai and US. The main motivation 
for establishing a subsidiary is to have market presence and provide better customer 
service in their key markets.  
 
“The reasons why we establish subsidiaries are so that we can get closer to our 
customers, understand our customers, be more responsive to our customers, and 
have a face in the market” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
By having a subsidiary, they can get closer and be responsive to their customers. The 
subsidiary will allow Tatua to provide better technical support to the customers and 





“Having people in the market is especially important to understand customers also 
where the opportunities are, who are we competing with, seeing other people’s 
products, talking to people, getting a feel of what is happening there”  
(CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Subsidiaries have some benefits that are not provided by export. Subsidiaries can 
strengthen the connection, trust, and deep understanding of the market culture and 
values.  
 
“Having people in the market that we can trust and talk to and be connected with 
means that we understand better what doing business is like in those countries. You 
don't really understand until you live in the market. You really need to live in the 
country to really understand the country, culture, how business is done, what the 
values are. What export doesn’t provide. That’s the reason we have people in the 
market” (Senior Manager of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Besides that, the benefit of having a subsidiary is better traceability of the product 
used by customers so Tatua will have better control for their supply chain. 
 
“That’s one of the reasons we set up the subsidiaries in China because it is a very 
sensitive market. So, we would know who we are selling our products to and what 
they are being used for so that we will have certainty that the products we are selling 
are being used for the purpose that we intended for or manufactured for so that they 
don’t put customers or consumers at risk and don’t put our business at risk as well” 
(CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
In 2003, Tatua discussed the possibility of creating their first subsidiary in Japan as 
one of their biggest markets. Tatua’s existing Japanese customers also wanted todo 
business directly with Tatua. Mr. Yukio Ninomiya, as the head of product 
development at Tokyo-based Nippon proteins, was the person who played an 
important role and support in establishing the subsidiary and became the first 





“We have the former president of Tatua Japan who has been with us a long time so 
he understands Tatua. We have in the very early days, our former CEO that spent 
approximately 10 years living in Japan so he was up there with the NZ Dairy Board 
and beaome our CEO. He has a good knowledge of Japan and made it very helpful 
and very good for the relationship with the customers. In the case of japan, we were 
able to find the right people to lead Japan." (Chairman of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Registering a foreign company in Japan was not straightforward. Tatua appointed a 
Japanese legal firm to assist them. Three months later, Tatua Japan was established 
in near record time by Japanese standards. Mr. Ninomiya was appointed as the first 
President of Tatua Japan Co Ltd with the help of three staff. Currently, Tatua Japan 
is led by Shin Mitarai with 12 staff. Even though all of the employees are Japanese, 
Tatua did not find any significant challenges of different nationalities because they 
maintain a good connection with them. Ninomiya’s capabilities delivered good 
results; within two years Tatua’s caseinate sales into Japan had tripled. By 2007, 35 
per cent of Tatua’s exports were to Japanese buyers. 
 
“In Japan, 100% of the employees are Japanese. The team in Japan spends a lot of 
time in New Zealand because when the customers come down to New Zealand for 
trial and work with us on products, one of them will usually come as well. So, we are 
very connected with them” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
After Japan, the second major initiative to improve earnings’ premium was the 
establishment of new sales and marketing subsidiary companies in United States and 
China. Both of the companies were fully resourced and have commenced business 
operations in 2015. The senior management of Tatua said the reason to choose China 
and US is because of the strategic size and demand of products. 
 
“Before the establishment of subsidiaries in China and US we used to sell through 
distributors. We decided to establish subsidiaries there because they are strategic in 
size, and also a fit for the types of products that we manufacture”  





Half of 4000 tonnes of caseinate that Tatua produced each year went to North 
America that was formerly marketed by Fonterra. Tatua then established a 
distribution relationship with Farbest Brands in New Jersey. Farbest was an 
established distributor with more than 50 years’ experience and had a nationwide 
distribution service providing specialised ingredients to United States’ food 
manufacturers. Tatua decided to establish a subsidiary in the US where the process 
was uncomplicated.  
 
“In US it’s very straightforward, some other geographies are much less 
straightforward. So, it's about having partners around the world that we can get 
advice from and help when we step into the market. It’s also about getting the right 
people in the market as well” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Tatua USA, based in Center Valley, Pennsylvania, has two staff who are led by 
President Peter Cheplick. All of them have US Citizenship. 
 
"In the case of the USA, we decided to choose an American who has  New Zealand 
experience, who knows the company well and also have same values and experience 
that we require in that particular market." (Chairman of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Meanwhile, in China, the establishment was less straightforward and and  needed 
longer time and preparation. 
 
“China has a big opportunity but sensitive market. You need to understand the way 
they are doing business, culture, rules and regulation to be successful. The best way 
to understand them is not by being at the bottom of the world, but you need to be up 
there in the market so you can understand what's going on” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
In choosing a suitable leader in China, Tatua considered someone with vast 
experience about China as a sensitive market. 
 
“In the case of Tatua Shanghai, we elected a New Zealander up there who had 




vast Asian and Chinese experience, then came back to Tatua. So, we put him to 
China.” (Chairman of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Tatua Shanghai has three staff based in Xintiandi. It is currently led by President 
James Gordon with the help from local staff. 
 
“We have another gentleman who spends about nine years in NZ but he is Chinese. 
So, he understands Tatua. He is very helpful; he can speak Mandarin well and 
understands the culture well. The rest of the team are Chinese nationals”  
(CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
The Chairman of Tatua emphasized the importance of having an experienced 
employee to help the successful establishment of their subsidiaries. 
 
“So, it's very helpful having an experienced senior executive that either resided in 
that country or has had a lot of customer experience in the market”  
(Chairman of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Tatua initiated a close relationship with the key distributors in Japan, US, and China, 
but Tatua did not acquire them. They established their own subsidiaries in those 
countries. Tatua maintains a close relationship with the key distributors in the 
subsidiaries’ market as partners. According to Tatua, direct foreign  investment is not 
really expensive because they do not build manufacturing plants overseas. Their 
subsidiaries only represent as sales offices.  
 
“Subsidiaries are not overly expensive. Our model is we do all of the manufacturing 
here in New Zealand. The subsidiaries we have in the market are simply sales offices; 
they are the face of our business in market. If we were setting up manufacturing 
facilities in market, then it would be a whole lot more complicated” (Senior Manager 
of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Tatua ensures they maintain a strong balance sheet so there will be always be 





“Capital is not really a challenge. We are not a huge company but big enough to set 
up a  subsidiary, because we make sure that we have a good strong balance sheet so 
that we have capital to invest in opportunities when they come up. Also, so that we 
can be ina  strong position if there is a financial crisis, but of course we don’t want 
that to happen” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Tatua is open to any opportunities of having subsidiaries in other markets; however, 
they are also careful to justify the financial condition of having a subsidiary. 
 
“There’s a possibility to have another subsidiary but at this stage we have got a very 
nice balance with the three subsidiaries we have. Probably from the economic point 
of view we need a critical measure of business to justify the investments of putting a 
subsidiary in place” (Chairman of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Subsidiaries are not directly considered as more profitable compared to the other 
internationalization approaches as stated by their CEO; 
“We have some products that we send directly to the world and some of them are 
very profitable as well, but it just depends. There’s no rule there that the bigger 
market is actually more profitable. I can't say it's more profitable or not because it 
depends so much on price, the country, the category, the segment, we try to run very 
lean subsidiaries because there is a cost. We don’t want to be a high cost business” 
(CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
In fact, Tatua need to be careful because having a subsidiary means adding cost to 
their business, especially if they have expatriates living in their foreign market. 
 
“We have to be careful because it's actually adding costs by having people in market. 
If you have expatriates in markets, it is very, very expensive. That’s why a lot of 
international companies prefer to have local employees rather than having expats. 
Expats cost money. Many companies try to get away from these expenses and go to 





Tatua understands the importance of working efficiently, by not having too many 
people working in subsidiaries because of the additional costs they need to spend. 
Tatua is very careful in selecting the right people to be placed in the markets. 
 
“There's always an argument of having more people in the market because if being 
in the market is good, so more might be better, but that's not always the way. We 
need very intelligent and productive people in the market who can make stuff happen 
and send the right signals back to Tatua so we can develop the products here and get 
them out to market so people in subsidiaries can sell them through and have direct 
contact with customers.” (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
Tatua believes that the key benefit of having a subsidiary is not gaining profitability, 
but it is more about establishing a close relationship, better communication and 
transfer of information. 
 
“Subsidiaries are the arm of the business in some ways. By having people in the 
market,  we got a better chance to understand what the real opportunities are and 
strong relationship that leads to far better transfer of information from the customers 
back to Tatua. So, flow of timely accurate information would be the key benefit and 
also the development of very close relationships" (Chairman of Tatua, 2018) 
 
5.1.10.3.  Licensing 
Tatua also performed another internationalization strategy by having licensing 
agreements for their technology. Tatua helps the setup and maintenance of the 
licensed technology with an agreement for 5-10 years with the Australian company, 
Tatura Milk. In these mutually beneficial partnerships, Tatua licenses its 
manufacturing intellectual property and, in turn, receives product royalties, which 
creates value by providing additional revenue streams. 
 
“We have a couple of licensing agreements for some of our technology. So, we are 
not licensing the product itself but some technology that we have so the other 
companies can manufacture products using that technology; in return we receive a 





They chose to license their technology because it has the opportunity to grow their 
business as explained by the Chairman: 
 
“Because we can make some money out of it. We licensed our technology that they 
want to access and they are prepared to pay for it. This is good for our business and 
could grow our business. It’s the right thing to do, let’s do it.”  
(CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
However, licensing has not been the focus strategy of Tatua’s internationalization 
because of some challenges that might arise. 
 
"Challenges of licensing are very similar to joint venture. There can be more conflicts 
so we are very careful about those to decide. That’s not an area that we are keen on 
growing" (CEO of Tatua, 2018) 
 
5.1.11. Analysis of Tatua’s Internationalization Strategy 
Tatua can be categorised as an entrepreneurial cooperative with a highly individualised 
structure. The absence of external shareholders implies that the company could be 
categorized as an internal, entrepreneurial co-operative. The company pursues a focus 
strategy, which is appropriate for this kind of co-operative with a structure that strictly 
regulates milk supply and a capital structure that facilitates investment in value-added 
production. 
 
Tatua starts their internationalization by exporting through NZDB as the single dairy 
exporter in New Zealand. Following the dissolution of NZDB, Tatua had a transition time 
to develop its own export network. Over time, Tatua evolved and wanted to further grow 
their business by not only exporting through distributors. They have established 
subsidiaries in their three significant markets. They also use licensing as one of the 
internationalization strategies because of the opportunity to maximise their resources and 
add value to the business. Each of the internationalization strategies has its own benefits 






















There are several factors that influence Alliance to choose their internationalization 
strategy (Table 23).   
Table 23. Influencing factors of Tatua's Internationalization Strategy 
















   




Note: (+++) as the most influencing factor and (+) as the least influencing for each internationalization 
strategy. 
 
Network and experience are the most influencing factors in export. In the transition time 
after deregulation of NZDB, the first thing Tatua did was to contact their customers and 
partners to develop their own global network. They had years of earlier experience, 
making it easier for them to operate the independent exports. Network and Experience 
are also the most influencing factors in subsidiaries. Tatua already had a long-standing 
relationship and long business experience with their partners in Japan, China and USA 
before they decided to establish their subsidiaries there.  
 
Human Capital is the second most influencing factor in export. Tatua assigned a special 
team that was very resourceful in understanding the market for export. The 
knowledgeable team has allowed Tatua to analyse the market and understand the legal 
requirements to enter the destined export market. Human capital also influences the 
subsidiaries.. The key behind the success all of the three subsidiaries was placing the right 
person that had suitable knowledge and capacity to lead the subsidiary. The selected 
leaders know Tatua very well and have a strong background of knowledge about the 
foreign market. The capabilities of these leaders have allowed them to successfully 
develop the subsidiaries. Human capital is quite influencial in the licensing as well. In 
licensing their technology, they send capable employees to give technical support and 
maintenance, therefore knowledgeable human capital is a very important asset in their 
licensing approach. 
 
Financial resource is quite an quite influencing factor to establish foreign subsidiaries 
because they have to allocate investment capital and it is adding to the operational cost. 
Financial resources are not  considered that much in exports and licensing because they 
needs less capital and have less risk than direct foreign investment. 
 
The technology, research and innovation have allowed Tatua to license their latest 
technology to other companies, therefore, are the most influencing factors. The 
technology, research and innovation also influence the export and subsidiaries because 
Tatua’s focus business strategy is relying on collaboration with customers to develop 






5.2. Alliance Group Co-operative Case Study 
5.2.1. Company overview  
Alliance Group is a global leader in procuring, processing and marketing the world’s best 
quality red meat products. Alliance Group is currently New Zealand’s only 100% farmer-
owned red meat co-operative consisting of over 5,000 shareholder farmers, both in the 
South Island (90%) and the North Island (10%). 
 










































As a co-operative, the aim of the Alliance Group  is to maximise returns to farmer 
shareholders and support them to operate profitable and sustainable farms. Alliance 
maintains a good balance sheet with an annual turnover in 2017 of $ 1.53 billion and 
doubled the operating profit from last year to $20.2 million. Alliance has also halved its 
core debt reducing it to $19 million in 2017. 
 
The Alliance Group has a portfolio of more than 1600 products that have been sold to 
more than 65 countries across the globe. Alliance has a wide range of red-meat products 
including lamb, mutton, beef, and venison sold in carcass, or specific cuts, both in frozen 
and chilled form.  Additionally,  Alliance Group is one of the world’s largest suppliers of 
wool, hides, pelts, casings, tallow and meal. The Alliance Group strives to create the best 






Alliance has eight processing plants employing approximately 5,000 people. The 
processing plants are strategically located throughout the South Island and lower North 
Island. Annually, around 7,000,000 lambs and sheep, over 200,000 cattle and 90,000 deer 
are processed by Alliance Group. 
  
5.2.2. History 
The Alliance Group was initially formed in 1948 as Alliance Freezing Company 
(Southland) Limited to facilitate meat processing for Southland farmers. The first 
processing plant started operation in 1960, located in Lorenville, near Invercargill. In 
1980, Alliance Group’s ownership structure changed and became a farmer-owned co-
operative. The co-operative broadened its operation in 1987 by opening four processing 
plants with the acquisition of CS Stevens Ltd. The Alliance Freezing Company officially 
changed the name to Alliance Group after acquiring Waitaki International Ltd and the 
opening of the tenth plant in 1990.  The Alliance Group has been growing its business by 
ongoing acquisitions. Table 25 shows the key steps of the Alliance Group timeline from 
a small business growing to become a global company: 
 
Table 25. Milestone of Alliance Group 
Year Milestone 
1948 Alliance Group formed aiming to provide an alternative processing facility for 
Southland farmers, Alliance Freezing Company (Southland) Limited was 
formed 
1960 First Alliance Group plant opens Located in Lorneville, near Invercargill 
1975 Acquired subsidiary in UK  
1980 Alliance Group becomes a co-operative. Alliance Group’s ownership structure 
changed and the business became farmer-owned and run 
1987 Four plants opened with the acquisition of CS Stevens Ltd, a local meat 
processing company. The first big period of sustained company growth 
1990 Official name changed after acquiring Waitaki International Ltd and opening 
tenth plant, Alliance Freezing Company officially became known as Alliance 
Group. 
1991 Livestock numbers decreased following the withdrawal of government farm 
support in the mid-1980s, and responded by rationalising plant operations 
1995-
1999  
Following a successful capital-raising plan Alliance Group underwent 
restructuring, and began exploring new opportunities including venison 
processing 
2001 By 2001 Alliance group were processing in excess of 7 million lambs, 1 million 
sheep, 140,000 cattle and 80,000 deer annually in seven strategically placed 
South Island plants 
2003 Alliance Group expands into the North Island through the acquisition and 




2008 Alliance Group purchases the assets of Levin Meats, doubling sheep and lamb 
capacity in the North Island as well as providing cattle processing facilities. The 
acquisition takes Alliance Group's total number of plants back up to nine 
2012 With reduced livestock numbers from conversion of sheep and beef properties 
to dairy, Alliance Group consolidates a number of processing operations:  
- Closing the Sockburn plant 
- Transferring venison processing to the Smithfield site in Timaru 
- Upgrading the Mataura beef plant 
- Transferring sheep and lamb processing to Lorneville 
2013 Pure South brand born.  Alliance Group launches the revitalised product brand 
Pure South, which brings together a number of brands to create one flagship 
international brand 
2014 Investment in Mataura Plant commenced, upgrading and reconfiguring the plant 
and specialising in processing beef 
2015 Refreshed company strategy with focus on continuous innovation and cost 
reduction to provide better returns for Farmer Shareholders and a major Health 
and Safety initiative to ensure people’s safety 
2016 New Primal Cutter installed at Smithfield and Pukeuri plants  
2018 Launch of a new corporate identity and logo 
Source: https://www.alliance.co.nz 
 
5.2.3. Current Strategy 
Alliance is implementing a business transformation strategy which is focused on 
maximising operational efficiency and capturing more market value (Figure 18). Alliance 
has made great steps in lowering costs, increasing operational efficiency to improve yields 
of meat, and use investments for continuous improvement. Now, Alliance puts more 
focus on the second loop by a better understanding of consumer segments in the global 
market, differentiating of products in the market and developing new products and 















The company’s business transformation strategy is derived from seven pillars which are 
embodied in various business projects (Figure 19). As a co-operative, the business 
operation is based on co-operative principles. Alliance put the farmer shareholders at the 
heart of every decision they make. Alliance continues to invest in the business to build a 
better co-operative that provides better returns for the farmer shareholders through 











Some of Alliance’s recent initiatives to maximise operational efficiency and capture more 
value from the market are: 
 $10.6 million investment in robotic primal/middle cutting technology 
 $2 million plus investment in beef x-ray 
 Developing a major new world-class deer processing facility at Lorneville plant 
 Invested over $1 million in improving rendering operations at Lorneville plant to 
improve the recovery of both tallow and meal 
 Launching a new “Pure South” product line for China and India 
 Investing $1.3 million in Pukeuri Plant to improve the recovery of offal  
 $10.6 million processing upgrade at Dannevirke  
 Creating a new marketing function separate from sales to enable a specific and 
targeted focus  
Figure 18. Alliance Group Business Strategy 
source:(Alliance Group Annual report 2017, 2017) 
Figure 19. Seven pillars of Alliance's business transformation strategy 




 Differentiating products by the development of a portfolio of premium brands by 
understanding the consumer in the market 
 
Allliance Group is committed to being a global leader and local hero in the red meat 
market by implementing meticulous production values, techniques, innovation and 
dedication to produce genuine quality products. Alliance practises innovative technology, 
food safety, standards for health and safety, environmental practices and animal welfare 
to achieve the standards of global markets. Alliance Group continues to maximise the 
value of existing markets and develop new ones to operate a profitable and sustainable 
business. 
 
In September 2018, Alliance Group marked the next stage in its transition into a food and 
solutions company with the launch of a new corporate identity. The new branding focuses 
on the strong connection with the farmer shareholders and reflects the growing demand 
from consumers who want to be directly connected to the farm. 
 
5.2.4. Business Structure 
The business structure of Alliance is more business to business transaction; consumer 
business is only a small part of their business.  
 
“When I became Chairman at that point, the Alliance operation model was essentially 
manufacturing products, in other words, really it is a business to business (B2B). We do 
a tiny bit of business with consumers but it's essentially B2B”  
(Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
As a global red-meat producer, Alliance offers a range of red meat and co-products: 
 Lamb and mutton 
The Alliance Group is the largest producer of lamb in New Zealand. Alliance delivered 
around 15% of the world's export traded sheep meat, both in frozen and chilled products. 
Alliance offers various lamb products for wholesale trade, restaurant, retail use, as well 





Alliance group delivers a wide range of chilled, frozen, aged beef cuts to meet exacting 
quality standards. The cattle are naturally grass-fed, and supported by enhanced research 
and technology to deliver high quality of beef. 
 Venison 
Alliance group sourced the venison from free-range farms and naturally raised without 
using hormones or steroids. The venison is sold in chilled or frozen with various cuts and 
specifications. 
 Co-products 
Alliance Group delivers a diverse range of co-products including fancy meats (offals), 
wool, hides, tallow, pelts, casings and Rendered Products Key include protein meals. 
 
The Alliance Group products are sold under two main brand names. All of the beef 
products, as well as mostly lamb and venison, are marketed with the Pure South brand.  
Some lamb and venison are marketed and sold under the Ashley premier brand. Other 
products can also be found jointly marketed with other New Zealand exporters as Spring 
lamb, Fresh Lamb and Four Seasons Cervena Venison brands. Alliance also offers 
premium products which are Te Mana lamb, Silere alpine origin merino and handpicked 
55-day aged beef. 
 
The Alliance Group secures 85% stock from its own shareholders. Each Transacting 
Shareholder is required to have a Standard Shareholding. It is determined by a formula 
which is based on the amount of livestock that has been supplied in the past, or is expected 
to be supplied in the future. The distribution of profits is based on the supply of livestock 
to the co-operative in the form of refunds, rebates, bonuses including pool payments. 
Another distribution of profit is based on shareholding through payment of dividends. 
The amount of dividend is determined by the Board of Directors at the end of each 
financial year. 
 
5.2.5. Capital Structure and Financial Performance 
In 2017, Alliance’s balance sheet showed a great performance by gaining an annual 
turnover of $ 1.53 billion which increased 9% from the previous year. Alliance doubled 




Alliance’s source of funding is from farmers’ shares and also debt. Alliance successfully 
halved its core debt, reducing it to $19 million in 2017.  
 
The earnings of Alliance are either delivered back to the farmer shareholders or re-
invested back into the business so that Alliance can deliver greater returns to the farmer 
shareholders. The shareholders’ equity at year-end has increased around 18% since 2015. 
In 2015, Alliance farmers experienced a tough season on-farm resulting in limited 
profitability so there were no pool surplus payments or dividends paid out. In 2017, 
Alliance bounced back and distributed pool payments of $11.4 million to the farmer 
shareholders.  
 
Table 26.Alliance Group’s Financial Indicators 2014-2017 
Financial Indicators 2017/2016 2016/2015 2015/2014 
Annual Turnover $ 1.53 billion $1.4 billion $1.5 billion 
Operating profit 
before tax, pool 
distributions 
$20.2 million $10.1 million $7.9 million 
Pool Distribution $11.4 million $9.8 million No Pool Payment 
Equity ratio 71% 70.6% 58% 
Source: Alliance Group Annual Report 2014-2017 
 
Alliance has achieved a significant improvement in profitability and achieved a stronger 
balance sheet that allows them to further develop their business. This can help them reach 
a stronger, sustainable and more resilient business for the farmer shareholders. 
 
5.2.6. Governance Structure 
 Board of Directors 
Alliance Group is governed by a Board of Directors who are responsible for setting 
strategic direction and control the management of the company to deliver maximum result 
to their shareholders. The Board of Directors should consist of not more than ten directors 
including both elected and appointed directors. The elected directors should not be less 
than six and not more than eight directors. One-third of the elected directors retires by 
rotation each year and may stand for re-election. There might be up to four appointed 
directors who are usually appointed for three year terms. The current Board of Directors 





Figure 21. Alliance Group Organizational Chart 
 Management Team 
The Board of Directors delegates the company’s management responsibilities to an 
appointed CEO supported by other executives helping the daily operation of the co-











Alliance’s CEO has stated that employees are vital for the co-operative. Alliance 
continues to build the organisational capability by implementing leadership courses or 
training programs for their employees. 
 
 “Employees are playing a vital role in the evolution of the co-operative. They embody 
the co-operative spirit, the ethos of working together, and with farmers, to build the 
customer experience.” (CEO of Alliance Group, Media release, 2018) 
 
5.2.7. Alliance Group Competitive Position 
5.2.7.1.Competition in the Industry 
The competition in the red-meat industry is quite intense referring to the growth of 
global production and trade. The total world meat production has increased by 1.25% 
to 323 metric tons in 2017. The contributors to the production growth are USA, 
Russia, Turkey, Argentina, India, and Mexico. The global trade of meats was also 
expected to rise to 5% in 2018. The world meat trade in 2017 increased 1.5% from 
2016. The growing exporters of meat are led by Canada, India, Thailand, Argentina, 
United States, and Ukraine (OECD-FAO, 2018). 
 




New Zealand is also a significant exporter of red-meat. Brazil, Australia and USA are the 
main competitors for New Zealand markets (2017). New Zealand and Australia have a 
competitive advantage in sheep and beef production compared to other countries, which is a 
lower production cost with high-quality products, and are expected to continue to be major 
players in the global market ([AGMRC], 2018).  
 
New Zealand mainly exports red meat in the form of raw material ingredients for 
manufacturing or processing in other countries. There are opportunities for New 
Zealand to process more value-added products to capture more value in the market 
(iFAB 2013 Meat Review, 2014).  Alliance realized the intensity of competition in 
the global market and the importance to differentiate their products to be competitive 
in the market. 
 
“The world is awash with protein, and so ,on one level, the competition is intense. 
So it comes down to how much we can differentiate ourselves from other competitors 
and in the reality if you've got the total market for protein you’ve got the market for 
animal protein, red meat protein, lamb, so as you sort of work your way through 
those sort of stages it narrows up to the number of people that like your product, 
heard of your product, can afford your product and want your product”  
(Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
To face the high competition in the red meat industry, Alliance implemented a 
strategy to have a portfolio of brands for a various range of markets so they could 
capture more value from the market. 
 
“Our distributors like Alliance because we provide quality products and then within 
Alliance we have a portfolio of brands as well, so we have premium, middle range 
brands, and sort of discount brands. Sometimes with two people in the same market, 
we will have two brands operating in the same market that people have access to” 
(Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
The key to survival is to have product differentiation that gives competitive 





“The key is using our strengths, our unique produce from this unique land and 
matching it to the needs of consumers around the world. Consumers want to know 
the provenance of their food and the values of the people behind their meal. They 
want to know what makes our produce different and worthy of their investment.”  
(CEO of Alliance Group, Media release, 2018) 
 
5.2.7.2. Power of Suppliers 
While the global market for red-meat is intense, Alliance finds that domestic 
competition to source the raw material is a bigger cause for  concern. 
 
“The competition with other New Zealand companies is all about raw material. It’s 
a bigger issue than the competition for the market offshore. The global market is 
ample big enough for sought, but the problem is sourcing raw material of livestock 
within New Zealand. It’s really intense; if you lose the battle for raw material in NZ 
you die” 
(Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
Therefore, it is important for Alliance to maintain the loyalty of their shareholders to 
secure the red-meat supply. Alliance believes that one way to be competitive is 
offering a higher price for the suppliers. Besides improving the pricing structure, 
Alliance also offer other financial benefits in the form of advance payments, pool 
distribution payments, loyalty payments, and bonus share issue. Alliance planned to 
pay a non-taxable bonus share issue to farmer shareholders in December 2018 based 
on supply to the co-operative. Alliance also has paid more than $15 million in loyalty 
payments during 2017/2018. These initiatives are expected to strengthen the loyalty 
of suppliers.  
 
Alliance also see some advantages as a co-operative where many farmers prefer to 
supply to them, because of the sense of ownership of the business and other services 
or benefits they can receive as shareholders. 
 
“Pay them more than anyone else. You certainly have to be competitive on what you 
pay, but there are other factors that farmers value as well. Access to killing space 




place, and their ability to take an ownership stake in your business. In other words, 
we are a co-operative, where a lot of farmers would prefer to deal with a co-operative 
than a corporate, but we still have to perform in terms of pricing at the farm gate” 
(Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
Alliance is open for new shareholders to join the co-operative. Any farmer producing 
cattle, lambs, sheep, or deer, both in the South Island or North Island, can become a 
supplier. The benefits of being a shareholder include: 
 An ownership interest in the company, with corresponding voting rights 
 Eligibility for a share in distributions when approved by the Board in the form of 
rebates, refunds or bonuses (including pool payments) 
 First preference for processing space allocation 
 The option to supply stock under a Yield Quality Contract, with associated yield-
based premiums 
 The ability to qualify as platinum and gold suppliers, with eligibility for incentives 
such as advance payments and contract offers 
 
5.2.7.3. Power of Customers 
Alliance Group believes that one of the key successes in the global market is to be 
responsive to the need of customers. Alliance is currently more focussed on building 
a differentiated portfolio of products, brand development, added value products and 
developing premium brands to respond to the need of customers and capture more 
value from the market.  
 
“The key of success is to deliver to customers; what they want, when they want it, 
what form they want it, at the right price” (Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
There is a growing demand from customers who want to be directly connected to the 
farm. It is important for Alliance to ensure traceability of their product and establish 
a sustainable supply chain. Alliance has been inviting the key customers to New 
Zealand including representatives from the UK, Europe, US, Japan and China. The 
customers are able to directly meet the farmers, meet the team, see the processing 




marketing team are also active in visiting customers in the global market and 
participating in global events as an opportunity to meet new clients and customers. 
 
Alliance also believes that it is essential to develop a close relationship with their customers 
to build trust and run a sustainable business. 
 
“Relationships are important; if you don't have a good relationship it just becomes a 
transaction based around price. So, we try to move beyond just being a transactional 
relationship to being a more strategic long-term relationship. We are a co-operative, we are 
in a game where the farmers run their farms for 40-50 years and they expect us to have 40-
50 years’ relationship in the markets. So, we're not interested in just trading, one person one 
day, one the next, to us that is not a sustainable model. It’s just built around the spot market. 
We want to be established in a long-term relationship with people who are going to promote 
our brands in the market” (Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
5.2.7.4. Threat of substitute products 
The red-meat products in New Zealand are well known for their high quality with 
low cost production and good traceability (Hutching, 2018). However, there are also 
quite a lot of substitute products available in the market. 
 
“There are Australian lamb, Canadian lamb, Spanish lamb, French lamb, beef from 
everyone in the world” (Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
Besides the red meat, other meat like chicken, turkey, and even plant-based products 
could also be considered as substitute products. Plant-based proteins are made from 
products including soy, fungi, nuts, legumes, grains and vegetables. Meanwhile, 
cellular agriculture uses harvested cells from animals to grow meat products in a 
laboratory. Red meat producers should be aware of these alternative proteins and 
create strategies to be competitive in the market (Pickett, 2018) 
 
The strategy that Alliance has implemented to overcome the problem is by product 
differentiation that can reach various consumer segments. 
 
“Within Alliance we have a portfolio of brands as well, so we have premium, middle-




market we will have two brands operating in the same market that people have access 
to.” (Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
Alliance also keeps improving the efficiency of processing and investing in 
technology to improve the operational performance. Technology and innovation are 
part of Alliance’s key to eventually becoming more competitive than the substitute’ 
products in the global market. 
 
 “We’ve gone from selling frozen carcasses to chilled products where we can specify 
the yield and the quality. Yes, it’s a really big issue; technology has allowed us to 
provide a much higher quality product. We are investing enough to develop 
technology, research and innovation” (Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
5.2.7.5. Potential of new entrants into the industry 
The global consumption of red-meat is growing, both in developed and developing 
countries, along with the growth of the world population which was expected to be 
9.7 billion in 2015 (McNaughton, 2017). The global average per capita consumption 
in 1964 was 24.2 kgs , while in 2015 it had increased to 41.3 kg per year. The red 
meat consumption is still expected to rise by 2020 in developing countries are 
expected to increase 107 million metric ton, while developed countries will grow by 
19mmt (Hutching, 2018). 
 
This increasing global trend of red meat can be seen as a profitable opportunity so 
companies are interested in entering this industry. According to the Alliance 
Chairman, there is a threat of several new entrants to the red-meat industry in New 
Zealand.  However, it is not easy for the new companies to compete against the 
established companies. High investment is actually needed to build advanced 
processing facilities, moreover, long-term experience and networking are also crucial 
to compete in this industry. 
 
“It’s very easy to enter the industry. I’ve heard of about four in the last five years. I 
think a few of them are probably regretting it because they are not making any 
money” 





5.3.Analysis of Alliance’s competitive position 
The competitive position analysis, using the five forces tool, is used to understand how 
Alliance Group shaped the internationalization strategy based on external competitive 












The competition in the red-meat industry is high. To be competitive in the industry, 
Alliance implements a strategy to have a portfolio of brands for a various range of markets 
so they can capture more value from the market. 
 
The power of the supplier is high because Alliance faces tight competition with other red 
meat processors in New Zealand. Alliance Group, as the only 100% farmer owned red 
meat co-operative in New Zealand, actually offers more benefits to the farmers, so they 
prefer to supply to Alliance. By staying true to their co-operative values, it becomes 
strong enough to maintain the loyalty of suppliers who are also the owners of Alliance 
Group. 
 
The power of the customer is high because, to be competitive in the market, Alliance has 
to understand and deliver based on the changing demand of customers. To address this, 
Alliance always interacts directly with the customers to build a close and sustainable 

















The threat of substitute products is also high. The competition of other sources of protein 
and even plant-based protein in the global market is quite high. One of the key successes 
for Alliance to be competitive is the continuous innovation and technology to produce 
higher quality products that differentiate their products in the market.  
 
The threat of new entrants is medium because, even though the future of red-meat industry 
is promising, it is actually hard to survive the business in the industry. Some of the new 
entrants are facing challenges from the other companies that are more experienced and 
resourceful. 
 
Based on the external competitive factors in the red-meat industry, Alliance Group 
implemented an internationalization strategy by focusing efficiency optimization and 
differentiation of products to capture more value in the global market. Alliance operate 
the business based on the co-operative principles to benefit the shareholders. 
 
5.3.1. Internationalization Strategy 
5.3.1.1.Export 
Alliance Group is exporting 95% of its products to more than 65 countries. Exporting 
has become the main strategy of internationalization since the establishment of 
Alliance.  
 
“We have been selling to 65 countries around the world about 50 years, so there's nothing 
new about selling internationally. China is number one, and then it depends on what 
products you're talking. UK is a significant market, US is a significant market. Germany is 
important, also markets like Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, Belgium, and Holland”  
(Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
There are various considerations that Alliance takes into account when choosing the 
target market. The choice of market is based on the type of products they are offering 
and demanded by the customers in various market segments.  
 
“The factors depend on the product. Is it a meat product, is it for food, or clothing. 
Is it a country that you are even allowed to trade with, like Iran, for example. They 




then is it a product that sold in a consumer ready form or is it a product that needs 
more manufacturing.” (Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
Alliance has various approaches to exporting, starting from using their own 
distribution line, partnership with local distributors, or exporting directly with 
international traders. Normally, Alliance would prefer to partner up with locals, but 
it really depends on the situation and opportunity in the specific market.  
 
“It depends on the products, in some countries we own our own distributors, in others 
we have long-standing relationships with importers and distributor;, some products 
are just done essentially through traders over the phone” (Chairman of Alliance 
Group, 2018). 
 
Furthermore, Alliance has been developing and investing in new approaches in retail 
and e-commerce as they have been doing in New Zealand and China. The e-
commerce model could be implemented abroad in China because they have a strong 
relationship with China’s largest meat distributor, so they have the access to storage 
and distribution there. This model could not be implemented in all of the markets 
especially with a perishable product. 
 
“We take China for example, we were selling through Alibaba but we have a very 
strong relationship with the the largest sheep meat distributor in China. So, they 
provide our storage and distribution to sell through them. The online channel is not 
in any countries that we're already in because if you can't guarantee the last 
kilometer when you got a perishable product, then frankly e-commerce is nothing. If 
you haven't got the distribution already sorted, e-commerce is just not the main 
game.” (Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
5.3.1.2. Subsidiaries 
Subsidiaries are entities controlled by the Alliance Group in terms of governing 
financial and operating policies to obtain benefit from the business activities. The 
New Zealand Holdings (UK) Limited subsidiary in United Kingdom is the first 




contributor to Alliance’s international trade growth since UK is one of the major 
markets. 
  
“We have a subsidiary in the UK that is our importer and distributor. It was 
established in 1970. It used to be owned by three meat companies we bought and 
carry on” (Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
More recently, in September 2017, Alliance Group acquired the business of Goldkiwi 
Asia, a Singapore-based company now known as Alliance Asia. It is a well-
established company in red-meat marketing that has built channels across China, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam. 
 
“We also have business is Singapore. It was established by a Kiwi actually about 30 
years ago and so we dealt with him for about 30 years and then he wanted to retire so 
we bought the business there. We appointed a new GM there, while he is a Kiwi, he 
already lived in Singapore for about 20 years and married a Singaporean.” 
(Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
Before buying the company, Alliance had a close business relationship with 
Goldkiwi Asia for many years. It has played a key role in building a presence in the 
region, including supporting a strategic co-operation with Alliance’s important 
Chinese in-market partner, Grand Farm.  The Asia headquarters in Singapore will 
accelerate understanding and responsiveness to Asian customers’ connection to some 
of the world’s largest populations and their growing demand for quality foods, and 
lift visibility and engagement across all steps of the supply chain. 
 
The Alliance Chairman stated that by having a subsidiary in UK and Asia, Alliance 
can get better information about the market, gaining better traceability of products 
and eventually gain more profit from the market. 
 
“You get better information, you make more money, essentially you can trace where 
your products are placed in the market, and become a less transactional sales 





Even though subsidiaries bring many benefits, there are also challenges, such as the 
need of more capital to operate the business and the more complicated management. 
Alliance maintains a good balance sheet to have sufficient capital to invest, so 
financial capital is not considered as the biggest obstacle to establish a subsidiary. 
 
“It’s a more complex management of business; you have to supply more capital for 
you to operate down the distribution channel” (Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
5.3.1.3. Joint Venture 
The Alliance Group also has several joint ventures which are more commonly called 
Associates. Associates are entities in which Alliance has significant participation and 
influence in the business, but does not directly control the financial decisions and 
daily operations. The Lamb Co-operative Inc.in USA and The NZ and Australian 
Lamb Company Ltd in Canada are two international joint ventures of Alliance Group.  
Porkcorp New Zealand Ltd, High Health Alliance Ltd, Alpine Origin Merino Ltd are 
joint ventures based in New Zealand and not relevant to the internationalization 
process. 
 
“We have a large operation in North America in that we are the largest shareholder 
there. We are about 60% of the business and also two other NZ meat companies in 
it; it used to be four but one held out. We have other joint ventures in New Zealand 
but it's not part of our internationalization” (Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
Alliance decided to have a joint venture in North America for historical reasons. The 
North American market is recognized as significant for Alliance’s business growth. 
Alliance is not too concerned about the form of business because it only comes down 
to technicalities whether it is a joint venture or a subsidiary as long as there is an 
opportunity to develop their business. 
 
 
5.3.1.4. Strategic Alliances 
For Alliance, a long-term partnership is very important for a sustainable business. 
They acknowledge their long-standing distributors or importers which they refer to 





“Partners are essentially distributors. We know them extremely well, we have spent 
some time in their homes, we try to form really close relationships with these people. 
So, while we might not really actually own the company, it’s a very seamless 
relationship. 
(Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
Some of their significant partners are: Grand Farm (China), Prime Meats (Germany), 
Alexander Eyckeler Gmbh (Germany), Tesco (UK), Primex (France), Van Arde 
Food Group (Belgium), Frigo (Belgium)  
 
The Chairman also said that in order to develop the business, they set some goals and 
targets together with their partners.  
 
“We set targets together to achieve a very transparent business. Quite often we will 
be sitting down with their customers. Day to day ? is handled by our distributors; 
our people will be there meeting with the end customers with the distributors. And, 
likewise, the end customers, which in this case would be supermarkets or cash and 
carry, they would come to NZ and directly visit our plants and meet our people so 
we got to know a lot of our distributors and customers”  
(Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
For example, Alliance’s partnership with Grand Farm in China began more than 16 
years ago. Alliance and Grand Farm has collaborated closely from the beginning to 
maintain market leadership position in China. Alliance supported them with 
guidance, technical advice and expertise to develop co-operative branding 
programmes with Grand Farms. Another partnership is with Alexander Eyckeler 
GmbH in Germany which has been a business partner for more than 35 years. Since 
the beginning, Alexander Eyckeler GmbH has been an integral part of Alliance’s 
marketing strategy in Europe. 
 
This relationship could be considered a strategic alliance. The partners have 
contributed to the accomplishment of Alliance Group to date and they are helping 




market connections all around the world. The challenge in forming strategic 




Another internationalization process that is implemented by Alliance Group is the 
licensing. They have licensed some of their brands so the distributors are allowed to 
do marketing and promotional activities using Alliance’s brand.  
 
“We license the use of our brand; the distributors who are distributing our products 
have the right to do promotional works using our brand.”  
(Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
However, Alliance does not consider licensing as a main internationalization strategy 
because this cannot be implemented in all of their markets.  
 
”Some markets you can use branding, some you can't. The retail market may not 
allow, but the food service market might allow. If you go to the UK you don't get the 
brand on the shelf, you go to Germany or Belgium, and it’s totally different, you can 
find the brand on shelf” (Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
One of the challenges that Alliance is facing in licensing is other local competitors 
that are trying to pirate Alliance’s brand as they experienced in China.  
 
“When you got to China, it doesn't matter if you license them or not you find a whole 
lot of other people copying your brand. Like our brand is pure south, in China you 
can find pure north, they are trying to pirate your brand”  
(Chairman of Alliance Group, 2018) 
 
 
5.3.2. Analysis of Alliance’s Internationalization Strategy 
Alliance’s first internationalization strategy was exporting and they are still relying on 
exporting as their main approach. However, they are not only focusing on transactional 




to run a sustainable business. Therefore, they develop Strategic Alliances as one of the 
internationalization strategies. Over time, Alliance has acquired some foreign subsidiaries 
and joint ventures to expand their business in significant markets. Lastly, licensing only 
plays a small part and they are not considering this as a main approach of 
internationalization. Each internationalization strategy has its own benefits and 























There are several factors that influence Alliance to choose each of the mentioned 
internationalization strategy (Table 27).  Network and experience are the most influencing 
factors in export. To enter a new market for export, Alliance usually starts to approach 
local distributors and establish networks by understanding the market. Alliance already 




has more than 50 years of experience in exporting, therefore, they have a well-established 
global network that facilitates the exports. The network and experience are also the most 
influencing factors in choosing subsidiaries, joint venture and strategic Alliances. Before 
the acquisition of subsidiaries and joint ventures, they already had a long period of 
business relationship together with the partners in the respective countries.  
 
Human capital is quite an influencing factor in export, subsidiaries, joint ventures and 
strategic alliances. The expertise of Alliance Group’s employees plays an important role 
in developing their internationalization. Alliance Group sends them to overseas partners 
to give support and technical guidance for their business partners. Direct interaction is 
very important to establish a sustainable relationship with their partners. Human capital 
also influences the strategy, but not so much in the licensing. 
 
Financial resource is also an influencing factor to establish foreign subsidiaries and joint 
ventures because they have to allocate investment capital and it is adding operational 
costs. Financial resource is not considered that much in exports, strategic alliances and 
licensing because it needs less capital and possess less risk than foreign direct investment. 
 
Technology, research and innovation are the most influencing factors in licensing. By 
implementing the latest technology, Alliance can produce a high quality product that 
differentiates their product in the global market, thus it is possible to license its brand. 
Technology, research and innovation are also quite influencial  in the export strategy 
because it allows them to send perishable products overseas by still maintaining a high 
quality product. However, the establishment of subsidiaries, joint venture and strategic 
alliances are less influenced by the technology, research and innovation. 
 
 
Table 27. Influencing factors of Alliance's Internationalization Strategy 









     
Human 
Capital 










     

























CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION 
 
6.1.Internationalization Stage 
Based on the international product cycle theory, a product starts to grow in the local 




internationalization theory does not apply in the case of Tatua and Alliance Group 
because both of them could be considered as a born global co-operative since they focused 
on the global market soon after the establishment of the co-operative (Knight & Cavusgil, 
1996). Both co-operatives are constrained by the limited market size in New Zealand that 
has pushed them to become born-global co-operatives. So, the main motive of their 
internationalization is to gain new market access and find new customers to grow their 
businesses (Ritossa & Bulgacov, 2009; Bojman, 2014; Grunig & Morschett, 2017). 
 
Even though they are born global, both of them internationalized in a gradual process. 
Both of them initially export through foreign distributors, then direct exports and foreign 
direct investment. This is in accordance with the Uppsala Model internationalization 
theory which explains that internationalization is based on a sequential establishment 
chain. However, both of them are still not entering the fourth stage which is 
production/manufacturing in the foreign market (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). 
Both of the co-operatives put forward the quality of raw materials sourced within New 
Zealand. Building a production site outside New Zealand also requires more capital and 
human resources.  
 
History has shown that exporting was the earlier entry-mode choice of agricultural co-
operatives internationalization strategies in New Zealand  (Morris, 2017).  The same 
event also occurred in the two co-operatives studied. Both of them did not begin to export 
to the physically close countries as shown in the earlier theory in the Uppsala Model, but 
to countries with a bigger market opportunity for their products (Bell & Young, 1998).  
 
As born global co-operatives, both Tatua and Alliance Group are still using the export 
strategy because more than 90% of their transactions are contributed to by the export 
activities (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994). Both Tatua and Alliance still export through a 
distributor. They also do direct exporting for some of the bulk products, but in a smaller 
amount than indirect export. Porter outlines the importance of strategy formulation to face 
international competition in the export-based strategy. Based on the analysis of Porter’s 
five-forces, both co-operatives have implemented the internationalization strategy using 
differentiation and focus strategies (Porter, 1990). The Porter’s five forces were used to 
analyze the external factors of each industry which are addressed as the competitive 




internationalization strategy implemented by the co-operatives studied. Both of the co-
operatives produce specific and high-value products that give them a competitive 
advantage compared to the other companies in their sector (Masum & Fernandez, 2008).  
 
Both co-operatives are still coherent with the principles and values of co-operatives and, 
at the same time, proactive in optimizing opportunities which are the key to being 
successful in the internationalization process for co-operatives (Errasti et al., 2003). Tatua 
and Alliance could not yet be considered as pursuing a multinational internationalization 
strategy, because they currently have not controlled their industrial and commercial 
activities in over five continents around the world (Guillouzo and Ruffio, 2005). Tatua 
and Alliance have many similarities in terms of the internationalization stage. The 
differences can be seen in the choice of their internationalization strategies which are  
analyzed separately later in this chapter. 
 
6.2.Analysis of the Competitive Position 
The competitive position analysis, employing the five-forces tool, is used to understand 
how the co-operative shaped the internationalization strategy based on external 
competitive factors in each of their industry (Table 28).  
 
Table 28 Porter’s Five-Forces Analysis 
Five-Forces Tatua Co-operative Alliance Group 
Competition in the industry High High 
Power of Suppliers High High  
Power of Customer High High 
Threat of New Entrants Low Medium 
Threat of Substitutes Low High 
 
The competition in the industry is high for both Tatua and the Alliance Group. This 
condition influences them to strengthen their position by creating product differentiation 
in the market and ensure high quality of products and service.  The strong differentiation 
is one of their key of success to be competitive in the international market. 
 
The power of suppliers is also high for both co-operatives. However, the competition is 




within New Zealand. Therefore, in this case, there has not been any international strategy 
implemented to address the supply issue. Even though the competition of supplier is high, 
as a co-operative, each has the benefit of loyalty and sense of ownership from their 
suppliers who are also members of the co-operative.  
 
The power of customers is also high for both Tatua and Alliance. They shape their 
internationalization strategy based on the demands of their customers. Tatua and Alliance 
considered direct communication and interaction with the customers as an important 
strategy to be competitive in the international market. 
 
The threat of new entrants for Tatua is low, meanwhile it is medium for the Alliance 
Group. To enter the industry, high investment of processing facilities is required. Besides 
that, the knowledge, technology and innovation are also valuable assets to survive in this 
industry. Long-term experience and relationship also contribute to their success, which 
hindered other new players in overcoming the competition.  
 
Tatua consider that the threat of substitute products is still low because Tatua is playing 
in the niche market, offering specialized value-added products. On the other hand, the 
threat for Alliance is high. There are many other kinds of products from other producers 
that offer a wide-range of substitute products. This condition motivates the Alliance 
Group to create suitable internationalization strategies to successfully compete in the 
global market. 
 
The external factors analyzed as a competitive position, using the Porter’s five forces 
analysis, have influenced the co-operatives to shape their strategy of internationalization. 
By understanding the competitive position, they could identify their strengths and help 
them choose their strategy (Porter, 1990). Both of the co-operatives are still using the 
export-based strategy as their main strategy of internationalization. To be successful in 
the international market, each  co-operative implements a focus strategy and 
differentiation of product. This condition reinforces Donoso’s (2003) findings  the 
previous study by Donoso (2003), where he found that export-based strategies were 
considered as the main strategy of agricultural co-operatives in New Zealand. 
 




According to Donoso (2003), there are six types of the common internationalization 
strategy for agricultural co-operatives. The differences of internationalization strategies 
between the two co-operatives can be seen in Table 29.  
  







Export Direct Export   





Joint Venture   
Strategic Alliances   
Licensing   
External Sourcing   
Transnational Co-operative   
 
Based on the earlier theory, firms start to enter a foreign market by exporting before 
developing other forms of internationalization. Tatua and Alliance Group also used 
exports as their first internationalization strategy in the early establishment periods as 
born global co-operatives.  They are still relying on exports as their main approach of 
internationalization. They use both direct exports and indirect exports through 
distributors, depending on the type of product or market.  
 
A lot of references show that a strategic alliance is one of the most common strategies of 
an agricultural co-operative’s internationalization (Evans and Meade, 2006; Julia-Igual et 
al, 2012; Guillouzo, Perrot, and Ruffio, 2005).  The strategic alliance is chosen because, 
in general, it is cheaper and faster than establishing wholly owned subsidiaries. It could 
accelerate internationalization by using their partner's knowledge and resources (Garcı́a-
Canal, Duarte, Criado, & Llaneza, 2002). This is in accordance with the Alliance Group 




hand, even though Tatua has a very collaborative relationship with their customers and 
distributors, they do not yet consider any of their partnerships as strategic alliances. 
 
Both of the co-operatives have direct foreign investments. The difference is, Tatua 
established its wholly owned subsidiary, while the Alliance Group attained the 
subsidiaries through acquisition. Alliance’s strategy is similar to other agri-food 
multinational companies, such as Nestle and Unilever, that expand their businesses in the 
international market mainly through acquisitions and joint ventures (Schroder and 
Wallace, 1993). Acquisition has become one of the chosen strategies by many agricultural 
co-operatives (Errasti et all, 2003; Theuvsen and Ebneth, 2005). In contrast, Tatua has 
not yet pursued any acquisitions and joint ventures. Tatua tries to remain as independent 
as they can in order to avoid conflicts. 
 
The two co-operatives use licensing as an internationalization strategy. The difference is; 
Tatua license their technology, while Alliance Group license their brand. Franchise 
agreements aim to take advantage of the knowledge and assets of commercial activity 
brought to foreign countries (Guillouzo and Ruffio, 2005) 
 
Both co-operatives source their raw material within New Zealand and have no processing 
plants located in foreign countries, thus external sourcing for the main raw material is not 
considered as their internationalization strategy. Tatua’s membership is closed, unlike 
Alliance, but both of them have not yet considered the transnational co-operative strategy.  
This situation is different from other agricultural co-operatives, especially in Europe, such 
as Arla Foods and Friesland Campina that have begun to become transnational co-
operatives by recruiting foreign farmers from neighboring countries (Bijman et al., 2014).  
 
6.4. Influencing factors of Internationalization 
6.4.1. Network & Experience 
Based on the analysis of each case study, both Tatua and Alliance Group  show that 
network and experience are important factors in choosing their internationalization 
strategy. For Tatua, they are the most influencing factors for export and subsidiaries. 
However, for Alliance Group they are the most influencing factors for export, 
subsidiaries, joint venture, and strategic alliances. They are less influencing factors 





Table 30. Network and Experience Factor of both Co-operative 
 Tatua Co-operative  Alliance Group Co-operative  
Export   
Subsidiaries   
Joint Venture -  
Strategic Alliances -  
Licensing   
Note: (+++) as the most influencing factor and (+) as the least influencing for each internationalization 
strategy. 
 
The importance of network and experience factors for both of the co-operatives is in 
accordance with the network theory (Rastorgueva, 2014).  Both co-operatives have 
shown that direct networking, by regularly visiting the markets, is very important in 
building a strong network. Both Tatua and Alliance show that the strong relationship 
among customers and partners has allowed them to build knowledge and their 
reputation for international market penetration.  
 
Madsen and Servais (1997) also believe that an international network relationship is 
one of the key factors that help the internationalization from inception. Networking 
allows the co-operative to understand their customers better, then develop their 
products based on customers' demands. This  is very important to stay competitive in 
the international market. 
 
However, the case study of both co-operatives shows that by utilising the networking, 
they still internationalize gradually. This is in contrast with the network theory that 
suggests firms do not necessarily develop in a linear sequence of internationalization 




strategic alliances and further direct foreign investments because of the strong 
networking and long-term experience in their business. Tatua had a long business 
experience with Japan, China, and USA before they established the subsidiaries 
there. Alliance got the opportunity to acquire the subsidiaries in UK and Singapore 
because they already had a strong business operation and network there. 
 
6.4.2. Human Capital  
Table 31 shows that human capital is the second influencing factor for most of the 
internationalization strategies of both co-operatives. It is the second influencing 
factor for export, subsidiaries and licensing in Tatua. Meanwhile for Alliance, it is  
the second influencing factor for export, subsidiaries, joint venture and strategic 
alliances.  
 
Exports of Tatua and Alliance Group are influenced by human capital because they 
have a knowledgeable commercial team who travel the world approaching customers 
and distributors in order to gain knowledge about the target market for export. They 
would then decide how they would export to the promising market based on the 
team’s analysis.  
 
The establishment of Tatua’s subsidiaries in Japan, China, and USA is able to happen 
because they have the right people to be placed and be responsible to manage the 
business in those countries. The same situation goes for the Alliance group, where 
the right people contribute to the success of subsidiaries in UK and Singapore as well 
as the joint venture in North America.  
 
Human capital is the least influencing factor in licensing for Alliance. This is because 
the Alliance Group is licensing their brand abroad for marketing purposes by the 
local distributors, so not much human capital from the Alliance Group is involved in 
this process. In the case of Tatua, the human capital is more important to give 
technical support for the licensing of technology. 
 
Both co-operatives acknowledge that human capital is an important asset for them. 




management teams as well as employees that have contributed to the success of 
internationalization since inception (Madsen and Servais, 1997).  
 





Export   







Licensing   
Note: (+++) as the most influencing factor and (+) as the least influencing for each internationalization 
strategy. 
 
The right internationalization decision of each co-operative is also supported by the 
managerial capabilities of their Board of Directors that can improve the efficiency of 
international investments’ practice (Shen et al., 2017). Both co-operatives have made 
human capital a priority to their current strategy and used initiatives to develop the 
quality of people and leadership management. 
 
6.4.3. Financial Resources 
The financial resource is one of the internal factors considered by firms to plan their 
internationalization choice (Shen, Puig, & Paul, 2017). The case studies of both co-
operatives, as shown in Table 32, indicate that the financial aspect is the least 
influencing factor for export, strategic alliances, and licensing. Financial resource is 
the second influencing factor for the foreign direct investments; in the case of Tatua, 










Export   







Licensing   
Note: (+++) as the most influencing factor and (+) as the least influencing for each internationalization 
strategy. 
 
The result is in accordance with the literature stating that direct foreign investment 
requires the highest resources while licensing strategy requires the least financial 
resources. Wholly owned subsidiaries are considered to require higher resources than 
acquired subsidiaries (Erramili & Rao, 1990). However, in the case of Tatua, 
financial resource is not the main influencing factor because they are not developing 
manufacturing plants abroad; the subsidiaries only function as sales offices, thus the 
investment required is not that high. The Alliance Group’s subsidiaries, or joint 
ventures, have also served as sales and marketing office to operate the distribution. 
 
Further researchers argue that internationalization which require more investment are 
riskier because it involves greater financial exposure and requires more control 
mechanisms with greater complexity (Bijman et al., 2014). Tatua and Alliance both 
agree that subsidiaries and joint ventures pose a bigger challenge because more 
operational costs are  required. However, the direct foreign investment also offers 
benefit for the sustainability of business and more profit will ensue in their significant 
markets. Therefore, the financial resource has not been considered as the main 
influencing factor in choosing their internationalization strategy. 
 




Born-globals are usually associated with young, innovative, high-tech or knowledge-
intensive firms (Scott-Kennel, 2013). The literature states that the technology factor 
could contribute to the acceleration of the internationalization process of exporting 
agri-food companies (Serrano & Acero, 2015).  Both co-operatives are using 
technology, research and innovation to support their internationalization, however, 
these are not considered as the most influencing factors for most of their 
internationalization strategies (Table 33). 
 
For Tatua, it is the second most influencing factor for export and subsidiaries because 
they are relying on innovative value-added products and collaboration to develop 
products with their customers. In the case of  the Alliance Group, it is the second 
influencing factor for export but the least influencing factor for subsidiaries, joint 
venture and strategic alliances. Both of the case studies reveal that the technology, 
research and innovation is the most influencing factor in licensing. However, both 
Tatua and the Alliance Group have, until now, not considered licensing as their main 
strategy of internationalization.  
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Based on the literature, the development of technology, especially the internet, could 
rapidly accelerate internationalization through e-commerce and direct export 
channels (Serrano & Acero, 2015). However, in the case of Tatua and Alliance, the 
use of the internet could not replace the importance of direct communication. Even 
though the internet could reduce costs and the time of face to face interactions, Tatua 
and Alliance Group still regularly send their people overseas to meet their customers 
and distributors to strengthen the relationship and network. Tatua only use direct 
exports for the bulk commodities which are a very small percentage in their business. 
The Alliance Group already implements the use of e-commerce, but it is not 
considered  their main strategy because they mainly do business to business which is 
not really suitable with an e-commerce approach. 
 
6.5. Risks and Challenges of Internationalization 
Based on the results, each internationalization strategy has its own challenges that need 
to be considered by the co-operatives, as seen in Table 34. 
 
 
Table 34. The Challenges of Internationalization Strategy 
Internationalization Strategy Challenges 
Export Legal requirement, foreign exchange, 
traceability 
Subsidiaries Higher operation cost & complex 
management 
Joint Venture Higher operation cost & complex 
management 
Strategic Alliances Potential conflicts 
Licensing Potential conflicts, Brand piracy 
 
Some of the challenges in exporting include the external factors such as currency 
exchange and legal bureaucracy, as stated by Ritossa and Bulgacov (2009). Moroever, 




concerned with the challenges of managerial capabilities and organizational systems in 
accordance with the study of Scott-Kennel (2013).  
 
Both Tatua and Alliance agree that the foreign direct investment have more financial risks 
and need more control mechanisms; this is in accordance with the view of Brouthers 
(2002). However, in contrast with the view of  Hansen (2009), both co-operatives do not 
find financial resource as the biggest challenge for internationalization. Both of them 
manage a strong balance sheet and can raise enough capital to implement their 
internationalization strategies.  
 
Moreover, the risk perception might differ for every co-operative. The classification of 
risk might not be the same for every co-operative, therefore, the risk perception that 
Ahmed et al. (2002) stated in his study could not be applied to every co-operative. Tatua 
did not choose the joint venture strategy because they consider the risk of conflicts of 
interest in the future, therefore, they remain independent. Alliance, on the other hand, 
implemented the joint venture strategy despite all  the risks. Therefore, risks and 
challenges have also influenced the co-operatives in choosing their internationalization 
strategy 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
 
7.1.  Summary of Study 
The aim of this research was to describe the internationalization process of agricultural 
co-operatives in New Zealand and identify the influencing factors of the 
internationalization strategies. The key objectives of the study were to outline the 
internationalization process of the agricultural co-operatives in NZ, to identify the 
internationalization strategies chosen by the agricultural co-operatives studied, and to 
analyze the factors that influence the internationalization decision. 
 
The research question was answered and objectives were addressed by using multiple 
case studies from two chosen agricultural co-operatives in New Zealand. The Tatua Co-
operative and Alliance Group Co-operative were selected as the participants because of 
their succesful history of internationalization in the dairy and red-meat industry. Semi-




collection. This method enabled the researcher to obtain depth and comprehensive 
information from the key actors. 
 
The participants were selected by using a purposive sampling method in order to ensure 
that insights from the important and relevant actors were included in the study. The 
participants of this study were the CEO, Chairman, and senior management in the co-
operatives. Additionally, documentary data, such as annual reports, were used in order to 
support the primary data.  
 
The data analyses were then performed starting with the transcription of the recorded 
interviews then grouping them into categories. The next step was to analyze the results to 
answer the research question and objectives. The cross-case analyses were performed to 







7.2.  Limitations of  the Study 
There are some limitations in this study that need to be considered: 
 Owing to limitations of time and availability of the participants, only two 
cooperatives were included in this study. Several co-operatives were approached 
earlier on, but not many co-operatives were available and willing to participate. An 
attractive research proposal that could bring more benefits to the co-operatives is 
needed to attract more particpants for further studies. 
 Owing to the constraints of time and distance, a telephone interview was performed 
for one person. The timetable of this research was delayed because it took time to 
wait for the response of the co-operatives to accept the offer to participate. Therefore, 
the telephone interview was conducted. Based on the experience, the quality of data 
from the telephone interview were lower compared to the face-to-face interview. The 
quality of voice recording was not as clear as the direct interview. The  telephone 




features which are useful to establish rapport and probe more comprehensive 
answers. 
 The limited sample size of the interview might have limited the data for 
comprehensive qualitative analysis. Most of the key actors had quite a tight schedule, 
and some of the participants travelled outside the country for a long period. It was 
quite a challenge to schedule the interview according to the research timeline. 
 The study is limited only to the dairy and red-meat industry as a sample of New 
Zealand’s agricultural industry. Both of the sectors could be considered as a good 
sample as the biggest contributor of economy in New Zealand. However, analysis 
from more sectors could improve the quality of the study if more time was available. 
 
7.3. Conclusion 
This study outlines the internationalization process of agricultural co-operatives in New 
Zealand. The two co-operatives studied could be considered as born global because they 
went into the global market soon after the establishment. The limited size of the local 
market is their biggest motive to scale up their business through internationalization. 
However, even though they are born globals, they internationalized in a gradual way.  
 
The internationalization strategies of each agricultural co-operatives has been identified 
in this study. Both co-operatives are still using export through distributors as their main 
strategy of internationalization. They also use direct export for some of the products 
because it is less expensive. Both co-operatives are implementing foreign direct 
investment as their internationalization strategy after they establish long-term networking 
with their foreign markets. The difference is, Tatua established its own subsidiaries in its 
key markets, while the  Alliance Group established subsidiaries by acquisition. Alliance 
use joint venture and strategic alliances as their internationalization strategy, while Tatua 
remain independent. Both Tatua and Alliance use licensing as a small part of their 
internationalization and both of them have not yet considered the transnational co-
operative strategy. 
 
The external factors, analyzed as competitive position using the Porter’s five forces 
Analysis, have influenced the co-operatives to shape their strategy of internationalization. 
By understanding the competitive position, they could identify their strengths and help 




strategy as their main strategy of internationalization. Both of them agree that being a co-
operative has brought more benefit, especially to win the competition of suppliers. To be 
successful in the international market, both co-operatives implement focus strategy and 
differentiation of product. 
 
Moreover, the internal factors identified in this study have influenced the choice of each 
internationalization strategy of the co-operatives. This study reveals that the most 
influencing factors for both co-operative are  network and experience. This explains the 
gradual process of internationalization, because the co-operatives need time to build their 
network and collect wisdom through their long-term international experience.  
 
Human resource is another factor that influences the co-operatives in choosing their 
internationalization strategy. One of the success factors of their internationalization is 
because they have the right people with the right capability to lead their 
internationalization strategies. Moreover, both of the co-operatives agree that financial 
resources are not the main factor that influence both co-operatives for their 
internationalization strategy. It is more considered when choosing subsidiaries and joint 
venture because they have bigger financial risk than the exports.   
 
This study has shown that technology, research and innovation are the most influencing 
factors in licensing, but licensing is not considered as their main strategy of 
internationalization. This study also reinforces that technology does not have the biggest 
role in accelerating the internationalization process of the co-operatives. Lastly, the risks 
and challenges have also become a consideration in choosing the internationalization 
strategies. The challenges are different for each strategy and are perceived differently by 
each co-operative.  
 
7.4.  Implications of the Study 
This research represents the successful co-operatives in the agricultural industry of New 
Zealand, which are a big contributor to the economy of New Zealand. This research 
provides useful, additional insights to the agricultural co-operative sector in New 
Zealand. The study has contributed a comprehensive literature review on the topic of 






This research may be useful for the co-operatives studied to evaluate their further 
internationalization steps, considering the influencing factors identified in this study. It 
may also be useful to other agricultural co-operatives for their internationalization 
planning. This research provides substantial evidence of a successful co-operative 
expanding their market through internationalization. It provides a better understanding of 
the influencing factors that need to be considered when formulating a successful 
internationalization strategy.   
 
This research would be useful for organisations who are involved in co-operatives’ 
development programs, such as NGOs and governments. This research helps to 
understand the process of internationalization in New Zealand Agricultural Co-
operatives, and some of this knowledge will also be relevant to agricultural co-operative 
development in other countries.  
 
 
7.5.  Recommendation for further studies 
In order to obtain a better understanding of internationalization of the co-operatives in 
New Zealand, further research is recommended in the following areas: 
 Include more co-operatives from different sectors of the agricultural industry in New 
Zealand to confirm the factors identified in this study  
 Use of a larger sample size of respondents to perform a quantitative analysis which 
might provide more reliable and valid results 
 Study smaller co-operatives with different stages of internationalization to provide 
insight of comparison with the succesful co-operatives 
 Identify the risks for each of the internationalization strategy and analyze the 
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Appendix 1. Information Sheet 
 
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION STRATEGY 






Dear Sir/Madam  
My name is Harumi Aini from Indonesia. I am a Masters student of AgriCommerce at 
Massey University in Palmerston North, New Zealand. As part of my study requirement, 
I am conducting a case study research on internationalization strategies of New Zealand 
agricultural co-operatives. 
 
Project Description  
The global market is transforming rapidly as globalization is influenced by advanced 
information, communication, and technological (ICT) development. Companies in the 
food and agricultural sector, including agri-food cooperatives in New Zealand, have 
embraced these global trends. Many agricultural co-operatives in New Zealand have been 
successful in growing their business globally by implementing different 
internationalization strategies in the form of exporting and a range of other approaches 
including foreign direct investment. My specific interest is to better understand how co-
operatives have embraced these global trends to successfully internationalize. 
 
This research aims to describe the internationalization of agricultural co-operatives in 
New Zealand and identify the factors that influenced the decisions made when choosing 
suitable internationalization strategies.  
 
Implications of the Study 
This study will provide useful, additional insights to the agricultural co-operative sector 
in New Zealand. It will also provide a better understanding of the influencing factors that 
need to be considered when formulating a successful internationalization strategy.  This 
research will be a great learning opportunity for me to understand the process of 
internationalization in New Zealand agricultural co-operatives; some of this knowledge I 
hope will also be relevant to agricultural co-operative development in my home country. 
 
Invitation  
In that regard, I would like to include ...., as an example of a successful agricultural co-
operative that can provide rich information for this study. 
 
To fulfill the aim of this study, I intend to interview a small group of people involved in 
and knowledgeable of the co-operative’s current internationalization strategy. I will also 
examine whatever information is available to ensure I understand the cooperative and its 
markets overall. Therefore, I would like to invite you to participate in this study. 
 
This research proposal has been evaluated by the Massey University Ethics Committee 
and judged to be low risk. To ensure confidentiality, individual details of participants will 




facility and will be erased after five years. You will have the right to embargo the thesis 
and any subsequent publications for a stated period if there is any commercially sensitive 
information given. If you decide to take part, you will be asked to sign a participant 
consent form.  
 
Project contacts  
If you have any further queries, I would be pleased to answer them. You can contact me 
( , telephone: ), or alternatively my supervisors 
Prof. Nicola Shadbolt (N.M.Shadbolt@massey.ac.nz, telephone: +64(06)356 9099 ext. 
84793) and Dr. Elena Garnevska (E.V.Garnevska@massey.ac.nz, telephone:+64(06)356 
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Appendix 2. Interview Questions 
 
Interview Guidelines  
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION EXPERIENCE 
OF AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVES IN NEW ZEALAND 
 
 
Demographic Characteristics of Respondent 
- Name   
- Age   
- Education  
- Position  
- Experience & Responsibilities 
 
Company Background 
- History   
- Members   
- Employees   
- Markets   
- Financials & Trends  
- Business Units  
- How is the global competition for Tatua? 
 
Internationalization Process 
- How does Tatua internationalize 
 
 Export 
When started exporting 
How do you export 
Why do you choose export 
What are the markets 
Why export to these markets 
 
 Subsidiaries  
Where?  
When was it established 
Why establish subsidiaries  
Why these countries 
How do you establish the subsidiaries 
 
 Joint Venture (JV) 
Where?  
Are there any other foreign JV 
When was it established 
Why establish JV 





 Franchise & Licensing 
When start franchise/licensing 
Why choose franchise/licensing 
Where are the markets 
Why in those countries 
How do you franchise/licensing 
 
 Other internationalization processes 
 
- What are the challenges of each internationalization 
- What are the benefits of each internationalization 
- Which internationalization method is more profitable 
- Which internationalization has the least financial risk 
- What are other risks considered 
 
Factors of Internationalization 
Most influencing factors for each internationalization process:  
 
 Human Capital & Resources 
Foreign staff, training provided, skills needed, capital needed, how to manage 
financial, how to overcome capital challenges 
 
 Competition 
Intensity of global & local market competition, market opportunity, marketing 
strategy, treatmentof substitute products 
 
 Experience & Network 
Relevant business experience beforehand, how to gain access, the influence of 
existing network, the advantage of partnership 
 
 Market Knowledge 
Political, Economic, cultural/social, legal, environment 
 
 Technology, Research & Development 














Appendix 3. Participant Consent Form 
 
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION STRATEGY 
OF AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVES IN NEW ZEALAND 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
I have read the information sheet and have had the details of the study explained to me. 
My questions has been answered to my satisfaction, and I undersatnd that I may ask 
further questions at any time. 
 
I agree/do not agree to the interview being sound recorded. 
 
I agree to participate in this study under the conditions set out in the information sheet. 
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